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THE DIPACT OF BARCHRIS:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRACTICAL
AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF
ESCOTT v. BARCHRIS CONSTRUCTION CORP.-
SECTION 11 REVISITED
MA A. EvAns*
Scire Zege non iwo eat aerlxz earum
tenere 8W vim ao potetatm.1
INTRODUCTION
BAROMUS AND THE SECTION 11 PH0ENOMNON
On March 29, 1968, Judge McLean, of the United States Dis-
trict Court, Southern District of New York, handed down the
decision in Eicott v. BarChrsi OoMtMtion Co.porti*1&2 This
was, in essense, the first case to deal substantially with the "due
diligence" defenses afforded the defendants in a civil action
against them under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 8 for
damages sustained as a result of false statements or material
omissions in a registration statement 4 or prospectus.5
*J.D., University of Miami School of Law; L.L.M., Harvard Law School;
Associate, Loeb and Loeb, Los Angeles; member of Florida and California
Bars.
1. "To know the laws is not merely to understand the words, but their
force and effect." JusTINIAx, DIGEST.
2. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The case was a spurious class action
by buyers of debentures against (1) the corporation which issued the deben-
tures, (2) signers of the registration statement for the debentures, (3) the un-
derwriters, and (4) the corporation's auditor for damages sustained as a re-
sult of false statements and material omissions in the prospectus contained in
the registration statement. Finding that the prospectus contained material falsi-
ties and omissions, the court held that the defendants failed to sustain their bur-
den of proving the due diligence defenses asserted, or that the damage suffered
by each plaintiff had been caused by factors other than the material falsities or
omissions. The decision was limited to a finding concerning the immediate de-
fendants under the section 11 action, and reserved ruling on the cross-claims and
on the issue of damages. Id. at 652. The court denied defendants' motions to dis-
miss, and the case was settled before further judicial announcement.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964) ; hereinafter referred to as the Act.
4. Section 5 of the Act, simplistically stated, provides that whenever an is-
suer wishes to distribute securities to the public it must register the offering
with the Securities Exchange Commission (hereinafter referred to as the SEC),
U.S.C. § 77e (1964). Section 6 describes the requirements of registration, 15
U.S.C. § 77f (1964), and the form most commonly used is SEC Form S-1,
"Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933" (hereinafter re-
ferred to as S-1).
5. The prospectus, which is initially attached to the registration statement,
is a document which is circulated to the public to elicit sale of the securities
1
Evans: Impact of Barchris: An Analysis of the Practical and Legal Implic
Published by Scholar Commons, 1969
688 SouTr CARoaNA LAw R.vi-w [Vol. 21
The magnitude of the decision can best be measured by two re-
actions: that of the investment community (those involved direct-
ly in the public offering), and that of the purchasing public.
Initially, and of signal importance, is the fact that although the
decision is that of a lower court, and not binding upon the same
or other district courts, let alone the appellate divisions, it has
had an immediate and widespread impact upon members of the
bar within and without the securities field, accountants, invest-
ment bankers, and others connected with public offerings. Sec-
ondly, and obviously the phoenix of the above reaction, is the
potential awakening of the public to the ready availability of sec-
tion 11 as a suitable vehicle to recovery.
Section 11, although originally designated as the "teeth" of the
Act," the provision that would secure "truth in securities",7 has
experienced relatively little activity and has come to be known
euphuistically as the "neglected child" of the civil remedial sec-
tions,
Some causal factors have been suggested to explain the pau-
city phenomenon of section 11, 9 such as the exemplary task con-
offered. It contains, among various other things, a description of the type of
securities offered, the terms of the offer, a general description of the business
of the issuer, its financial position, and a description of the various officers and
directors. 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1964).
6. See Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE LJ.
171 (1933) ; Landis, Address before the N.Y. State Society of Certified Public
Accts., Wall Street Journal, Nov. 1, 1933, at 10.
7. Id.
8. As indicated by Professor Loss only 13 cases were reported in the first
29 years of the Act, and in the subsequent six years there were only 17 more
reported cases. It is interesting to note that judgment for the plaintiff was
awarded in only two of these cases, with six judicially approved settlements
being reported. Mention is also made of the fact that the two recoveries came
out of an estimated 18,000 filed registration statements. See 6 Loss, SECURTES
REGuLATioN 3820 (1969), and 3 Loss, SEcuarrms REGmuLATIoN 1691 (1961).
9. The experts are in disagreement as to the cause or causes of the section
11 phenomenon. One proposition set forth requires us to view retrospectively a
theory of section 11 posed in 1933 to the effect that "section 11 was designed
not so much to compensate the investor as to create an in terrorem effect in the
business community," and that this "aim is being achieved by the small num-
ber of cases." Comment, BarChris, Due Diligence Refined, 68 COLUm. L. REv.
1411, citing R. BAKER & W. CARY, CAsEs AND MATmALS ON CorORATIONS
1125 (3rd ed. unabr. 1959). That the civil liability section was perhaps de-
signed to have an in terrorem effect on the business community is not in dis-
pute, see supra note 6, at 173. It is doubtful that this has in fact occurred. The
alternative proposition gives credit to the bar and the accounting profession,
but cites the chief cause of section 11 inaction to the SEC's exacting examina-
tion of registration statements. Given the numerous actions initiated by the
SEC in either injunctive, criminal, or stop order proceedings, and the fact that
the SEC invariably issues a letter of comment on every registration statement
filed, which in almost every instance causes changes to be made in the statement
or prospectus, not to mention the fact that many registration statements are
2
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sistently performed by the Securities Exchange Commission, the
integrity and competency of those preparing the registration
statements,' ° and that settlement may have been effectuated in
many instances, although few settlements have been reported."
But certainly it is not too readily doubted that a great deal of
the neglect, concomitant desertion to other civil remedies, and of
course settlement, was due not only to the inherent limita-
tions of section 11, such as a security for costs provision, 12 a short
statute of limitations, 3 and the totally compensatory nature of
the section,' 4 disallowing punitive damages of any sort, but also
to the unclear and uncertain language of the section.
It should be borne foremost in mind at the outset that for all
its significance BarOhkiis may not, in the end analysis, generate
any more section 11 activity than before. On the affirmative
side, if there is a general tightening up of investigation proce-
dures, and adequate safeguards are taken to ensure truthful and
adequate disclosure of information, then the lack of suits under
section 11 will stand as evidence that the purposes and principles
of the Act are being fulfilled. On the other hand, if it is shown
that adequate measures are not being taken, that there are in fact
false or misleading prospectuses in circulation, then the continued
paucity of actions under section 11 will more than likely indicate
the desirability of modifying section 11 in order to make it a
more meaningful recovery section. If this not be done, then the
potentially more accessible and more lucrative recovery routes,
such as section 17 of the Act,'15 and section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934,16 which have already been utilized to
withdrawn, several due to the suggestion of the SEC as an alternative to a stop
order proceeding (Loss at 316), the latter position seems without doubt to be
more in line with common sense. See 3 Loss, supra note 8, at 316, 1690.
It bears mention that the staff of the SEC, already engulfed in work, and
unable to catch every false or misleading registration statement because of the
sheer volume, has just initiated a new policy of giving only a cursory review
rather than the customary review to a portion of the registration statements
filed, thus enhancing the possibility that more false and misleading prospec-
tuses will be circulated to the public.
10. 3 Loss, supra note 8, at 1690.
11. Sutpra note 8.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1964).
13. Section 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1964). The statute of limitations is one
year after discovery of the misstatement or omission, or after such should have
been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence, but no more than three
years after the security was first bona fide offered to the public.
14. Supra note 12.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1964).
16. The action is brought through a rule under the section, SEC Securities
Exchange Act Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968). The Securities Ex-
change Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1964) will hereinafter be referred to as the
Exchange Act.
1969]
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some extent, may find themselves host to the traditionally section
11 actions.17
It is to the BarChs court's treatment of the due diligence de-
fenses and related matters, the attendant impact of the decision
on the investment community, and the questionable effectiveness
of section 11, as either an in terorem deterrent to fraud or neg-
ligence, or as an accessable civil remedial vehicle, that this paper
is directed. To place BarSh-s in proper perspective and to best
understand the implications of section 11 the case will be pre-
sented in length, along with an historial and developmental
discussion of section 11. To best gauge the practical effect, as
well as the legal significance of BarChris to the investment com-
munity, a survey was taken of various counsel in the securities
field and an analysis of the results of the survey is included in a
later portion of the paper.
I. TnE SEcumns ACT OF 1933 AND SECTION 11
A. The Basic Phiosophy of the Act
The basic purpose of the Act was to bring about "truth in
securities."18 The Act was written so as to effectuate this basic
policy with the requirement of full disclosure. As stated by
Douglas and Bates: "All the Act pretends to do is to require the
'truth about securities' at the time of issue, and to impose a penal-
ty for failure to tell the truth."' 9 It is not the purpose of the
Act to view the securities on their merits. Whether the securities
are a "good" investment or "sound" is a determination left to the
purchasing public.
20
Congress ensured the public that not only would there be ac-
curacy in the information disclosed through the registration
statement and prospectus, but that there would be disclosure of
significant matters that had rarely in the past been disclosed.21
17. See notes 200-201 and accompanying text. The writer does not attempt
to argue the validity or propriety of utilizing other sections for traditionally sec-
tion 11 actions, but only points out that they have been utilized.
18. H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 3 (1933) ; S. Rep. No. 47, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933) ; Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43
YALE L.J. 227, 251 (19335.
19. Supra note 6, at 171.
20. The purpose was amply noted by Professor Loss:
Congress did not take away from the citizen his inalienable right
to make a fool of himself. It simply attempted to prevent others
from making a fool of him.
I Loss, SEcURITIES REGULATION 128 (1961).
21. Shulman, supra note 18, at 227.
[Vol. 21
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This is evidenced by the Act speaking to omissions as well as
false and misleading statements.
To best understand the development and significant features
of section 11 it would do well at this point to briefly view the
English statute from which it was modeled, leaving the more
complete analysis and comparison for later.
In 1933, when the Act was adopted, there was, as part of Eng-
lish law, the Companies Act of 1929.22 This Act was developed
from the Directors' Liability Act, 1890,23 which, as indicated by
Professor Loss, was a direct result of Derry v. Peek,24 and the
House of Lords' knowledge of the "impotence of the common
law deceit action in the realm of securities."
Recalling the Dery v. Peek decision, and the court's reluctance
to label the actions of "respected gentlemen" as "deceitful" and
thus refusing to convict them, we bring into sharp focus the prob-
lems which faced the investor attempting to recover funds as a
result of "negligent misrepresentation."
The older action of deceit, true to its name, was a rem-
edy for villainy .... Literally, the charge is a very
serious one. It is, in effect, an accusation of thievery, of
procuring money under false pretenses .... The remedy
appropriate against deceitful rogues was not to be ap-
plied to respectable businessmen who believed their
statements to be true, however unreasonably that belief
was founded.25
The English Act overcame the Derry v. Peek implications and
the basic common law requirements such as exhibited in LefLievre
& Deunes v. Gouvd,26 by negating the scienter requirement and
placing upon the defendant the duty of showing reasonable
grounds for belief in the truthfulness of the statement.
So too, and to effectuate the philosophy of full disclosure, the
scienter requirement has been replaced by the due diligence
defense of section 11(b). Also, the basic requirements of causa-
tion, reliance, and privity have been discarded, except to the ex-
tent that the defendants may show as a defense that the partic-
ular plaintiff knew of the misstatement or omission, at the time
of acquisition, or that, in mitigation of damages, the plaintiff's
22. 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, § 37 (1929).
23. English Directors' Liability Act of 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 64.
24. 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
25. Shulman, supra note 18, at 233.
26. [1893] 1 Q.B. 491.
1969]
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loss was not totally occasioned by the misstatement or omission
in the registration statement.
27
It should be noted that the issuer-as distinguished from the
signers of the registration statement, the directors, the partners,
the accountants and the underwriters-is not afforded the due
diligence defense, and thus, is in a sense an insurer against in-
vestor loss in the event there is a material misstatement or omis-
sion.28 This is contrary to the English view which excludes the
issuer from liability on the theory that the stockholders should
not suffer for the wrongdoings of the individuals.
B. Section 11-Some Initial Definitional Problem's As To "Per-
sons Liable" Under Sections 11 and 15
Section 11 (a) allows any person acquiring a security issued
under the authority of an effective registration statement, which
when such statement, or part thereof became effective,29 con-
tained an untrue statement of a material fact,30 or omitted to
state a material fact required to be stated therein, or necessary to
make statements therein not misleading, to sue, either in law or
equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction (1) every person
who signed the registration statement;31 (2) every person who
was a director of (or person performing similar functions) or
partner in, the issuer at the time of the filing of the part of the
27. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1964). However, if the purchase of the security
occurred after the issuer had generally made available to its security holders
an earning statement covering a period of at least twelve months after the ef-
fective date of the registration statement, the right to recover will be condi-
tioned upon proof of reliance upon the untrue prospectus. This provision is
based on the assumption that any purchase after the distribution of the state-
ment will be predicated on the statement and not on the prospectus. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(a) (1964).
28. Section 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1964).
29. Section 8(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a) (1964), specifies that a registra-
tion statement shall become effective 20 days after it is filed with the SEC, or
20 days from the date of any amendment filed, unless acceleration is requested
or was set in accordance with SEC Rule 460, 17 C.F.R. § 230.460 (1969).
Since the accuracy of the registration statement is judged from the effective
date no liability will arise before that time. In accordance with this, no liability
will arise from untruths or omissions contained in a preliminary prospectus,
not part of the registration statement, and section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b)
(1964), excludes summary prospectuses from section 11 liability. Lastly, it
should be noted that no liability will arise under section 11, where events tak-
ing place subsequent to the effective date, which events tend to make inaccurate
the registration statement, are not reflected in or by amendment.
30. See infra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
31. See section 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a) (1964), wherein it is statedthat the
issuer, the principal executive officer or officers, its principal financial officer,
its comptroller or principal accounting officer, and the majority of its board
of directors or persons performing similar functions must sign the registration
statement
[Vol. 2
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registration statement with respect to which his liability is as-
serted; (3) every person who, with his consent, is named in the
registration statement as being or about to become a director, per-
son performing similar functions, or partner; (4) every account-
ant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession gives
authority to a statement made by him,32 who has with his con-
sent 3 been named as having prepared or certified any part of the
registration statement, or as having prepared or certified any re-
port or valuation which is used in connection with the registra-
tion statement, with respect to the statement in such registration
statement, report or valuation, which purports to have been pre-
pared or certified by him; (5) every underwriter with respect to
such security.
There is added to this list, through section 15 of the Act:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership,
agency, or otherwise, or who, pursuant to or in connec-
tion with an agreement or understanding with one or
more other persons by or through stock ownership,
agency, or otherwise, controls any person liable under
section [11] or [12] .... 84
Although there was no "control" problem presented in Bar-
Chris it is certain that at some time the issue will be presented
and in that regard interesting questions will arise as to what
constitutes "control" for the purpose of section 15.85
The concept of control permeates the Act and has posed several
difficult problems especially with regard to the last sentence in
section 2(11) ,3 which for the purpose of finding "a statutory
underwriter" defines an issuer ".... [as] any person directly or in-
directly controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any person
under direct or indirect common control with the issuer." The
issue usually poses itself in relation to a claimed section 4(1) 87
exemption for a sale of unregistered securities and although sec-
tion 15 logically speaks only to "controlling" persons the task of
defining control appears equally as difficult there.
32. There is some controversy with respect to an attorney as an expert for
purposes of section 11 liability. See notes 67-69 infra, and accompanying text.
33. The consent must be in writing and filed with the registration statement
See section 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1964).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1964).
35. For an interesting discussion of the control problems see Douglas &
Bates, supra note 6, at 196.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 7b(11) (1964).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 77d) (1964).
19691
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This same control problem also arises under a section 4(4)38
brokers' transaction exemption in relation to its rule counterpart,
Rule 154,11 which limits the amount of securities a broker may
sell for a control person within a six month period, and Rule
133,40 the "no sale" rule, which allows control persons to sell
securities obtained through this transaction (a "cram down ex-
change") in equal amount to that allowed in Rule 154.
This most illusive concept is complicated by the wording of the
various sections. The definition in section 15 includes not only
those persons who exert control through stock ownership, but al-
so those persons "who through agenoy, or otherwise or through
agreement or understanding with one or more other persons by or
through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise controls any per-
son liable under section 11." This may include stockholder mem-
bers of the household of a control person; it may include per-
sons, who while not in a "stock control" position may by their
wisdom or business acumen have a strong say in management of
the company; it may include other corporations who by contract
or by a strong minority stock position have guiding influence
over the issuer or other persons liable under section 11, such as a
director or officer.
IL DFIr SEs AFORDED THE SECTIONS 11 AN) 15 DEFENDANTS
A. The Section 11 Defendants "
There are defenses afforded to the section 11 defendants with
the exception of the issuer who is held to some extent as an insur-
er. This is not to imply that the issuer is totally without relief.
For instance, it may show that the plaintiff knew of the mis-
statement or omission at the time of purchase and thus escape
liability.41 Also, an amendment to section 11 (a) has replaced re-
liance as an element necessary to be shown by the plaintiff where
the issuer has made generally available to its security holders an
earnings statement covering a period of at least twelve months
beginning after the effective date of the registration statement.42
Further, section 13, the statute of limitations applicable to sec-
tion 11, which limits recovery (the filing of the lawsuit) to with-
in one year after discovery of the misstatement or omission and
38. 15 US.C. § 77d(4) (1964).
39. SEC Securities Act Rule 154, 17 C.F.R. § 230.154 (1968).
40. SEC Securities Act Rule 133, 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1968).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1964).
42. See note 27, supra.
(Vol. 21
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in any event not more than three years after the security was
bona fide offered to the public, bars recovery against the issuer
as well as the other section 11 defendants.43 Lastly, under section
11(e) the issuer as well as the other defendants can mitigate
damages by showing that the depreciation in the value of the
stock did not result from the improper registration statement.
44
Liability can be avoided by any defendant, other than the is-
suer, provided that he can sustain the burden of proof-
(1) that before the effective date of the part of regis-
tration statement with respect to which his liability is
asserted (A) he had resigned from or had taken such
steps as are permitted by law to resign from, or ceases
or refused to act in, every office, capacity, or relation-
ship in which he was described in the registration state-
ment as acting or agreeing to act, and (B) he had ad-
vised the Commission and the issuer in writing that he
had taken such action and that he would not be re-
sponsible for such part of the registration statement; or
(2) that if such part of the registration statement be-
came effective without his knowledge, upon becoming
aware of such fact he forthwith acted and advised the
Commission, in accordance with paragraph (1), and, in
addition, gave reasonable public notice that such part of
of the registration statement became effective without
his knowledge;...45
Section 11(b) (3)48 provides the key affirmative defenses for
all defendants named in section 11(a) except the issuer. But be-
yond just creating a defense this section, read in conjunction
with section 11(c) ,47 dictates the duties and responsibilities of
the defendants described in section 11(a) and sets the stage for
the BarChris decision. These are the "due diligence" defenses.
Initially, it should be noted that section 11(b) (3) speaks in
terms of "expertised" and "non-expertised" portions of the regis-
tration statement. The distinction is important for it delineates
the various areas of responsibility and liability. The section pro-
vides an escape from liability for any defendant, other than the
issuer, who sustains the burden of proof:
43. See note 13, supra.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1964).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1964).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (3) (1964).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (1964).
1969]
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(3) that (A) as regards any part of the registration
statement not purporting to be made on the authority of
an expert, and not purporting to be a copy of or extract
from a report or valuation of an expert,... he had, after
reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe
and did believe,... that the statements therein were true
and that there was no omission to state a material fact
... and (C) as regards any part of the registration
statement purporting to be made on the authority of an
expert (other than himself) or purporting to be a copy
or extract from a report or valuation of an expert (other
than himself), he had no reasonable ground to believe
and did not beieve,... that the statements therein were
untrue or that there was an omission to state a material
fact .... 48
As to the expert he must show that after reasonable investiga-
tion he had reasonable ground to believe and did believe that
the statements contained in his report or valuation were true and
that there was no omission to state a material fact.
Section 11(b) (3) is unclear as to the experts' liability for the
unexpertised portions of the registration statement. Clarifica-
tion comes from a reading of section 11 (a) (4) which limits li-
ability to those statements which purport to have been prepared
or certified by the expert.49 Stated simply, experts are respon-
sible only for the portions of the registration statement they per-
48. Supra note 46 (emphasis added). The determination of who, or who is
not, an expert is crucial, for it alters the defenses considerably. In short, the
non-expert need not investigate into any of the expertised portions. The de-
fendants will, of course, attempt to show that all or portions of the registration
statement were prepared by experts. This was done in BarChris, where the
defendants argued to the court that the entire registration statement was pre-
pared by the attorneys and therefore "prepared by experts". The court re-
jected the argument. See notes 67-69 and accompanying text. Further, the
SEC is especially aware that attempts will be made to "expertize" portions of
the registration statement that do not demand expertization.
This whole machinery obviously was intended for such parts of
the registration statement as the financial data, appraisers' valua-
tions, engineers' reports, the opinion of counsel as to the legality
of the issue, and the like. The Commission will not permit the
central data.., to be 'expertized'. The loose use of 'hedge clauses'
which seek to shift responsibility to experts is regarded a material
deficiency...
3 Loss, supra note 8 at 1741.
For the SEC ruling on the expertization of counsels' legal opinions see SEC
Securities Act Rule 436(b), 17 C.F.R. § 23436(b) (1969).
Thus, it is clear that the expertized portions must be limited to those portions
that must be prepared by a specialist or professional.
49. See 3 Loss, supra note 8, at 1727.
10
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sonally prepare. They incur no liability as regards the unex-
pertised portions.
B. The Section 15 Defendants
Section 15 states that these defendants "shall also be liable
jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such con-
trolled person to any person to whom such controlled person is
liable, unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or rea-
sonable grounds to believe in the existence of the facts by reason
of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to
exist."
50
Since there is no imposition of the task of reasonable invest-
igation the section 15 defendant, in addition to having all the
collateral section 11 defenses, is relieved of showing due dili-
gence. Of course, there is the danger of "guilt by association",
that is, since he is a controlling person, if that first be proven,5"
there may be a presumption that he has access to extensive in-
formation and thus had knowledge of or reasonable grounds to
believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the li-
ability of the controlled person is alleged to exist. If this be the
case then the defendant is going to have a difficult task in pro-
ving passive ignorance, even though section 15 only requires that
of him.
There are situations where it is inequitable to allow the section
15 defendant the total benefits of the "passive ignorance" de-
fense, namely in the area of secondary distributions made by the
issuer on behalf of the controlling stockholder. Professor Loss
illuminates the situation:
Today, even when a registration statement is filed in
connection with a secondary distribution by a person in
in a control relationship with the issuer, that person is
not liable under § 11 directly; he is liable only under §
15, since he need not sign the registration statement. If
§6(a) were amended as proposed in 1941 ... three
changes would result in such a person's civil liability:
(1) the plaintiff would not have to prove control as he
does under § 15; (2) the defendant would not have the
extra defense afforded by § 15; and, (3) the defendant
50. See supra note 34 (emphasis added).
51. The burden is on the plaintiff, when suing a section 15 defendant, to
prove that the defendant was in a controlling situation. As previously indicated
in notes 34 & 35, and the accompanying text, this may be a difficult task.
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would be liable also if he were controlled by or under
common control with the person initially liable, whereas
§ 15 applies only to persons who control.52
I. EscoTT v. BARCHEmis CoNsTnucriow CoRtPoAnoN:
FoCus oN SEOTION 11, "MATMALIY" AND THE I MPICATIONS OF
DuE DmIGENcE
A. The Faotual Setting
The primary business of the defendant issuer BarChris was
that of building bowling centers. These centers included the
basic building unit which housed the "alleys" or "lanes" and most
often contained other facilities such as restaurants and lounges.
The business, relatively small when initially formed as a partner-
ship in 1946, grew substantially as a result of the development
and introduction on the market of automatic pinsetting machines.
This innovation was the stimulus toward making bowling a pop-
ular sport.
By 1960, BarChris, enjoying rapid growth as a consequence of
bowling enthusiasm, had increased its sales dramatically 3 and
was installing three per cent of all bowling lanes built in the
United States.
The company's normal method of operation was to enter into a
contract with the customer, secure a small down payment on the
purchase price, then proceed to build and equip the center. When
the building was completed BarChris would secure the balance in
the form of an installment note which it then discounted with a
factor, receiving part of the face amount in cash and leaving the
remainder as a reserve at the instance of the factor.
Beginning in 1960 BarChris resorted to a second method of
financing referred to in the case as the "alternative method"54
which essentially was a sale and lease back arrangement of the
interior of the building with the factor. Under this arrangement
the factor either leased the interior directly to a BarChris cus-
tomer or in several instances it leased the interior back to a sub-
sidiary of BarChris formed just for this purpose. In turn, the
subsidiary would then sublease to the customer. The major dis-
52. 3 Loss, .ipra note 8, at 1723.
53. According to the prospectus BarChris had net sales in 1956 of some $800,-
000 and by 1960, it had net sales of $9,165,000. 283 F. Supp. at 653.
54. Id. at 654.
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tinction between the two lease back variations was in the con-
tingent liability features of each. BarChris retained a 25% li-
ability to guarantee lease payments by the customers, but fully
guaranteed performance of the lease agreement between the Bar-
Chris subsidiary and the factor.
Both methods of financing placed BarChris in a tight cash
position and to this was added the compelling need to expend
considerable sums of money to defray construction costs. This
tight cash position became even more acute as operations ex-
panded.
In 1959, in order to obtain working capital, BarChris sold
560,000 shares of common stock to the public at three dollars a
share. By early 1961 it was in need of additional working capital
and offered 3.5 million dollar principal amount of 5'1% convert-
ible subordinated debentures under a registration statement
which became effective on May 16, 1961. As of this time Bar-
Chris' position was more precarious than ever. Customers were in
arrears in payments to BarChris as well as to the factor. It was
becoming increasingly apparent that the bowling industry was
overbuilt and since many of the operations were initially under-
capitalized they began to fail. Sales also fell off and by early
1962 BarChris was again in need of finances. It attempted an-
other common stock offering, but subsequently withdrew its reg-
istration statement. On November 1, 1962, BarChris defaulted on
the payment of interest due on the debentures.55
On October 25, 1962, purchasers of the debentures filed a class
action56 under section 11, alleging in the complaint numerous
material and culpable errors in the prospectus regarding the bal-
ance sheet and income statements for the year 1960 and for the
first quarter of 1961. They further challenged the accuracy of
the prospectus and charged that it contained material misrep-
resentations and omissions. The prospectus contained, among
other things, a description of BarChris' real property, material
55. On October 29, 1962, BarChris filed a petition for arrangement under
Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. The Chapter XI proceeding was converted
into a straight bankruptcy in March of 1963. Thereafter the adjudication in
bankruptcy was vacated and in November of 1963 BarChris was placed in re-
organization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. The trustees in re-
organization appeared in the instant case on behalf of BarChris. 283 F. Supp.
at 654, n. 5.
56. The action instituted was a spurious class action as the same was des-
ignated under F.R.C.P. 23 (a) (3) before it was amended on July 1, 1966. The
court allowed the parties to continue under the old rule.
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concerning its subsidiaries and comments on other aspects of its
affairs. The financial information included a consolidated bal-
ance sheet as of December 31, 1961, with explanatory notes, un-
audited figures as to net sales, gross profits and net earnings for
the first quarter ended March 31, 1961, figures as to the com-
pany's backlog of unfilled orders as of March 31, 1961, as com-
pared with March 30, 1960, and figures as to BarChris' contin-
gent liability as of April 30, 1961, on customers' notes discounted
and its contingent liability under the so-called alternative
method of financing.
B. Setting the Stage for Liability - The Issues and a
Possible Clarification of "Materiakity"
"On the main issue of liability", the court stated,
the questions to be decided are (1) did the registration
statement contain false statements of fact, or did it omit
to state facts which should have been stated in order to
prevent it from being misleading; (2) if so, were the
facts which were falsely stated or omitted "material"
within the meaning of the Act; (3) if so, have the de-
fendants established their affirmative defenses. 7
1. Misstatements and Errors in the Registration Statement.
The court found the registration statement to be inaccurate, con-
taining false and misleading statements while excluding infor-
mation necessary to make many statements contained therein not
misleading.
Addressing the financial statements as of December 13, 1961,
the court ascertained that sales were overstated by $653,900 due
to a misapplication of the percentage of completion method of
evaluating job completion ($148,900- Worchester & Atlas Bed-
ford contracts), an overstated contract price ($25,000 loan on
Burke Lanes), and the inclusion in sales of the entire contract
price of completed alleys which had not in fact been sold
($48,000 - Capital Lanes and Howard Lanes Annex). What
appeared to be sales were actually intracompany transactions,
i.e., a sale and lease back arrangement between BarChris, the
factor and a BarChris subsidiary.
Based on an improper sales figure the court found the figure
for net operating income for 1960 to also be incorrect. The
extent that it was incorrect depended upon the extent to which
57. 283 F. Supp. at 652.
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the incorrect sales figures for the five alleys in question were
carried into net profits. Profit, and consequently net operating
income, were overstated, profit by $246,605.
With the net operating income figure incorrectly computed it
followed that the computation for earnings per share was erro-
neous. The correct earnings per share figure should have been
ten cents less than stated.58
Current assets were also overstated by the inclusion of $14:7,466
in cash, which figure actually represented a temporary return of
the reserves to BarChris by the factor.59 This money was to be
returned within a month in order that the factor could have it
as security. To treat it as cash on hand without explanation of
its temporary nature was misleading.
Another misstatement in current assets was the inclusion of
$125,000 as a receivable for the sale of Federal Lanes. Russo,
the Vice-President, believed that $100,000 of the $125,000 was
paid by Federal stock in lieu of cash. The court stated that if
this were true then the stock should have been shown as an asset
of BarChris. It was not. The stock in actuality constituted se-
curity and not a down payment.60 The court held that in any
event since Federal was in bad financial straits on December 31,
1961 (in arrears to the factor Talcott on a discounted BarChris
note) a reserve should have been set up in the amount of
$50,000, thus reducing current assets by that amount.
Continuing to examine the current asset figure the court found
that the company was treating the entire amount of the reserves
held by the factor as a current asset. Since part of the reserves,
in the normal course of business, would not have been released
within one year and since a portion of it would never be released
due to customer defaults on the notes it was error to treat the
entire amount as a current asset. In total, current assets were
overstated by the sum of $609,689.
Contingent liabilities (on notes discounted and on lease agree-
ments) was understated by $375,795. There was a failure to
58. The prospectus listed earnings at 750 per share, but the court's calcula-
tion found it to be 650 per share. Id. at 660.
59. The transaction was not a direct one. Talcott, the factor, delivered the
reserves to BarChris Financial Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Bar-
Chris Construction, and BarChris Financial then turned the money over to
BarChris. The court did not mention whether this was in fact a "masking",
although it would have appeared to be so. Id. at 661.
60. 283 F. Supp at 662.
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compute at 100% the liability BarChris had incurred by fully
guaranteeing the leasing agreements between the factor and the
BarChris subsidiaries. This liability was computed at 25%, the
amount BarChris usually guaranteed on direct leases to cus-
tomers with the standard factoring agreement.
The court then addressed the 1961 figures, holding that the
errors in sales and contingent liabilities in the 1960 figures were
carried over into the unaudited figures for the first quarter of
1961. To these figures more error was injected.
The contingent liability figures as of April 30, 1961 were un-
derstated by $618,853 due to a failure to compute BarChris'
liability at 100% for the lease obligations of its subsidiaries.
The net sales, gross profit and net earnings figures were
erroneous. Due to two intracompany transactions (Bridge Lanes
and Yonkers Lanes-both operated by subsidiaries) there was
an improper inclusion in sales of $519,800 and a consequent
improper gross profit overage of $230,755, thus reducing net
earnings proportionately.
The backlog as of March 31, 1961 of customer orders was over-
stated to the amount of $4,490,000 by including contracts which
had been cancelled (Woonsocket, which became an intracompany
transaction, and Atlas-Lincoln) or which should not have been
considered as "firm" (Six T-Bowl interiors and Bowl-a-Way),
reducing the figure from $6,905,000 to $2,415,000 on unfilled
orders.
The court found that the text of the prospectus contained false
and misleading statements with respect to officer loans, use of
proceeds, customer delinquencies and in the description of Bar-
Chris' business.
The prospectus expressly stated that all advances had been
repaid and this was meant to include loans made to BarChris
by three officers to the amount of $155,615. The court found that
while BarChris had issued checks to these three officers on
March 13, 1961, it was in fact waiting for the proceeds of the
debenture issue to cover the checks and by agreement the checks
(save one) were not to be tendered' until after the proceeds had
been received and deposited. In any event new advances were
made to BarChris shortly before the effective date for which
BarChris immediately issued checks but again with the under-
standing that the same would not be cashed until after the pro-
ceeds of the debenture issue had been received.
[Vol. 21)
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It was further found by the court that the portion of the
prospectus describing the intended use of the proceeds for the
"construction of a new plant", development of a "new equip-
ment line", for a loan to a subsidiary with the remainder to be
kept for working capital, was thoroughly false in that 60% of
the proceeds was intended to repay officer advances, bank loans,
prior construction costs and for a loan to friends of one of the
officers.6 '
The statement in the prospectus that "[slince 1955, the Com-
pany has been required to repurchase less than '/ of 1% of such
promissory notes discounted by such unaffiliated financial in-
stitutions" 62 was impliedly false and misleading in that it gave
the impression that BarChris was experiencing no customer
difficulties when in fact by April 21, 1961 BarChris knew that
it would have to repurchase delinquent notes on at least four
centers totaling in excess of $1,350,000.
Lastly, the court also found misleading the failure to describe
BarChris' business as including, besides the construction of the
centers and their interiors, the engaging in the actual operation
of one alley and the intention to operate two more as well as the
possibility that it may have to operate several more because of
pending customer delinquencies and defaults. It was stressed
that the risks and problems in operating a center were obviously
different from those involved in constructing one.
2. Materaity. In order for a plaintiff to recover for the false
or misleading statements in the prospectus he must show that the
facts misrepresented were "material" in nature.
The court initially adopted the definition of material from
the SEC regulations:
The term "material", when used to qualify a require-
ment for the furnishing of information as to any sub-
ject, limits the information required to those matters as
to which an average prudent investor ought reasonably
to be informed before purchasing the securities regis-
tered.63
In setting forth a more specific interpretation of the material-
ity test the court stated:
61. Id. at 676.
62. Id.
63. SEC Rule 405(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(1) (1969).
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The average prudent investor is not concerned with
minor inaccuracies or with errors as to matters which
are of no interest to him. The facts which tend to deter
him from purchasing a security are facts which have an
important bearing upon the nature and condition of the
issuing corporation or its business.64
Applying the test to the 1960 financials the court held most
of the errors in the figures not material and especially found that
the overstated sales and understated contingent liabilities were
not bad enough to deter the average prudent investor from
purchasing the securities even if he had known the true facts.
Since the debentures were characterized as speculative65 the
primary attraction to the investors was the convertability feature
coupled with the growth potential of the company, and what
Judge McLean did find materially misleading in the 1960 fig-
ures was that when taken together the overstated current assets
and the understated current liabilities resulted in a divergence
in the net current asset ratio from 1.9 to I to 1.6 to 1. The court
held that 1.9 to 1 was bad enough, but 1.6 to 1 would have made a
significant difference, even to a growth oriented investor.66
Regarding the misstatements and omissions relating to the
state of affairs of the company in 1961 the court experienced no
difficulty in finding them all to be material.
3. The Due Diligence Defenses. Having determined that the
prospectus had in fact contained materially false and misleading
statements and omissions the court faced the unique and hereto-
fore undefined due diligence defenses.
Initially there was a claim that the attorneys for the issuer
and the underwriter were "experts" within the meaning of the
section and thus responsible for the entire registration statement
since they had prepared it. 67 The court rejected the contention
64. 283 F. Supp. at 681. The court quoted from Charles A. Howard, 1
S.E.C. 6, 8 (1934), where a material fact was defined as:
... a fact which if it had been correctly stated or disclosed would
have deterred or tended to deter the average prudent investor
from purchasing the securities in question.
Cf. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965) . . .Restatement of Torts §
538 (2) (a) (1938) ; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402B com-
ment g (1965).
65. The securities were given a "B" rating by the investment rating services.
283 F. Supp. at 681.
66. Id. at 682.
67. Id. at 683.
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out of hand stating that to do otherwise would be an unreason-
able interpretation of the statute in that it would hold an at-
torney as an expert simply because he worked on the registration
statement.68 The court was obviously aware that to hold other-
wise would expertise the entire registration statement thus reduc-
ing the defendants' duty to investigate to one of merely proving
that they had no reason to believe that the registration statement
contained untruths.
The accountants were the only ones held to be experts and
thus as to the portions which purportedly were prepared by them
as experts they had to show that an investigation was made to
ascertain the truth of the statements contained therein while the
other defendants had to show that they had not reason to believe
that they contained anything other than the truth.
It is assumed that attorneys could be experts within the
statutory definition if in a particular instance they held them-
selves out as experts, as for instance if they were to give an
opinion as to pending legal proceedings or as to the legality of
the securities being offered. But like every other expert there
is a requirement that they file their consent to be named as an
expert.6 9
Th, "Inside" Officers arnd Directors. The President, Vice-
President, Chief Executive officer and most of the directors of
the company were held to have been aware of the company's
affairs, had failed to make an investigation and thus had not
sustained the burden of proving due diligence.
The Treasurer and Chief Financial officer were found to have
purposely withheld information from the accountants and as
such could not maintain their due diligence defense.
The Comptroller was held to have been aware of specific mis-
statements in the financials defeating his due diligence defense
as to the expertised portions of the registration statement. Fur-
ther, he was found to have made no investigation as to the truth
of the unexpertised portions and as such could not sustain his
defense in this regard either.
The last, insider, the company Secretary, who was also an
attorney, was allowed to rely on the audited figures since he did
68. Id.
69. See supra note 48.
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not participate in the management of the company and thus had
no personal knowledge of the company's books of account or
financial transactions. But he was not without some knowledge
of the company's affairs as the court found, for it was estab-
lished that he was aware of the existence of all of the subsidiaries
since he had formed them himself and had an insight into several
of the affairs of the corporation having prepared the company
minutes. The court skirted the question of whether he had
sustained his burden as to the expertised portions but held in-
stead that since he had not conducted an investigation he had
not sustained his burden as to the unexpertised portions. "As
a lawyer he should have known his obligation under the
Statute.
70
The Outsid Direotors. Liability was imposed on three outside
directors after they failed to establish their due diligence defense
as to the unexpertised parts of the registration statement even
though all three had become directors on the "eve of the financ-
ing" and consequently had little opportunity to familiarize them-
selves with the company's affairs:
Section 11 imposes liability in the first instance upon a
director, no matter how new he is. He is presumed to
know his responsibility when he becomes a director. He
can escape liability only by using that reasonable care to
investigate the facts which a prudent man would em-
ploy in the management of his own property. In my
opinion, a prudent man would not act in an important
matter without any knowledge of the relevant facts, in
sole reliance upon representations of persons who are
comparative strangers and upon general information
which does not purport to cover the particular case.
To say that such minimal conduct measures up to the
statutory standard would, to all intents and purposes,
absolve new directors from responsibility merely because
they are new. This is not a sensible construction of Sec-
tion 11, when one bears in mind its fundamental purpose
of requiring full and truthful disclosure for the protec-
tion of investors.
7 '
All of these men were very reputable, one enjoying a position
as chairman of the board of a ban, one being a civil engineer,
70. 283 F. Supp. at 687.
71. Id. at 688.
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and the last being a partner in the primary underwriting firm
handling the debenture issue. Other than a preliminary check
through Dun & Bradstreet and a check of the BarChris banks
by the board chairman no further investigation was made either
by him or by the engineer.
Coleman, the underwriter partner, made preliminary investi-
gations to ascertain whether his firm should undertake the fi-
nancing of the debenture issue. He continued to investigate
until he was elected as a director at which time he ceased to in-
vestigate relying solely on the underwriters' counsel to complete
the investigation. As will be shown Ballard, underwriters'
counsel, failed to make a proper investigation and as a result
Coleman was bound by his failure.
The court did find that all had a sound basis for relying on
Peat, Marwick and Co., the accountants. None had any reason
to believe that the figures were untrue, and thus all had sustained
their defense as to the expertised portions.
The court treated the issuer's counsel in special fashion. This
director was also a partner in the law firm which had prepared,
besides the debenture registration statement, the registration
statement for the common stock issued in 1959 and for the
warrants issued in January of 1961.
Although he was sued in his capacity as a director and not as
a lawyer, in his unique ptsition, as the court stated, "more was
required of him in the way of reasonable investigation than could
fairly be expected of a director who had no connection with this
work."7 2 The defendant contended that to hold that he had not
made a reasonable investigation was in essence to have required
him to have made an independent audit of the figures supplied
to him by his client and was also tantamount to holding that he
could not rely on his client's statements.
The court believed that he had no knowledge of the errors in
the 1960 figures, stated that he was not obligated to investigate
them, and held that he had sustained his due diligence defense
as to the expertised parts of the registration statement.
Concerning the unexpertised portion he could not rely on the
statements of his client and thus had failed to establish his
defense in that regard since he had failed to read the factoring
agreements where he would have discovered BarChris' con-
tingent liability on the subsidiary leasing agreements was 100%
72. Id. at 690.
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instead of 25% and that upon default, and in the event that
BarChris did not repurchase the notes on demand the factor
could accelerate payment on all customer paper in its hands; had
failed to request and read all contracts pertaining to unfilled
orders, which on the company's books meant firm commitments;
had failed to read the minutes of the various subsidiaries which
would have revealed that BarChris was about to operate two
bowling centers; had failed to have the minutes of certain
Executive Committee meetings typed up which, if done, would
have revealed that the company was constructing or about to
construct twelve centers for which it had no contracts and would
have further discovered that one of the most flagrantly delin-
quent customers had filed a bankruptcy petition in Chapter X;
had failed to adequately inquire into officers' loans and vice
versa; had failed to verify statements as to the intended use of
the proceeds from the debenture sale; and had failed to examine
the records as to delinquencies, records which BarChris man-
agement had kept. Lastly, as the court points out, had he in-
quired of the factor Talcott or examined the correspondence
between BarChris and Talcott he would have discovered the true
facts and consequently would have been aware of the falsity of
the statement regarding delinquent customer note repurchases.
After making all due allowances for the fact that Bar-
Chris's officers misled him, there are too many instances
in which Grant failed to make an inquiry which he
could easily have made which, if pursued, would have
put him on his guard. In my opinion, this finding on
the evidence in this case does not establish an unreason-
ably high standard in other cases for company counsel
who are also directors. Each case must rest on its own
facts.
73
The Underviters. None of the underwriters, except the man-
aging underwriter, made an investigation and the limited investi-
gation made by one of the partners of the managing underwriter
along with underwriter's counsel was held to be unreasonable.
Rather than reading the major contracts, inquiring into the
factoring agreements, or reviewing the minutes of the parent
and subsidiary corporations, underwriter's counsel was content to
rely upon the representations of management to verify the in-
formation contained in the registration statement. Of course,
73. Id. at 692.
[Vol. 21
22
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 5 [1969], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol21/iss5/2
INTACT oF BAxRCmUs
some investigation was made, some minutes were read, and some
meetings were attended where the registration statement was
reviewed and revised, but on the whole counsel was content
to accept answers to questions rather than in attempting inde-
pendent verification.
In order to make the underwriters' participation in this
enterprise of any value to the investors, the under-
writers must make some reasonable attempt to verify the
data submitted to them.74
The court found almost no attempt to verify management's
representations.
The managing underwriter delegated its investigative respon-
sibility to its counsel and it is therefore bound by the unreason-
able performance of that task. Since the investigation is con-
cerned mainly with facts the underwriter cannot claim reliance
upon legal advice to establish its due diligence defense. The
other underwriters likewise could not rely on the managing
underwriter and its counsel and they are all bound by the failure
reasonably to investigate. The court did not decide whether the
group underwriters would have been liable for failing to investi-
gate in the event that the managing underwriter was found to
have established its due diligence defense.75
The Accountants. Judge McLean had previously ruled that
the accountant's liability was limited to only those portions of
the registration statement purporting to be made on its authority
as an expert, namely the 1960 financial figures. But, he coun-
seled, the belief in the accuracy of those figures must be
measured as of May, 1961, the effective date of the registration.
As a consequence the court placed great emphasis on the account-
ants' "S-1 Review" .
The purpose of an S-1 Review (a review of events subsequent
to the date of the certified balance sheet) is to ascertain whether
any material change had occurred in the company's financial
situation which should be disclosed in order to prevent the certi-
fied figures from being misleading.
The court, for the most part, ignored the 1960 audit, never
came to an express determination that the investigation for the
74. Id. at 697.
75. See notes 152-57 infra.
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preparation of the certified financial was unreasonable, rather
only implying the same. It chose to expressly condemn the de-
fendants' haphazard S-1 Review, labeling the results as "useless",
while holding that the written program for review, although not
followed, was in accordance with generally acceptable auditing
standards.
7 6
In his review the accountant merely read the directors' minutes
given to him by a company officer, which minutes did not in-
clude minutes of the executive committee, or from any of the
subsidiaries, and compared the quarterly trial balance figure
with the 1960 figure.
IV. ANALYSIS- PLACING BARCHIs In Pimsarw vE
A. Development and a Comparative A'nalysis cit an Englsh
Forefather
As earlier noted, section 11 was modeled substantially from
English law, and section 11 fairly well follows section 37 of the
Companies Act, 1929, in spirit if not in language.7' But there
are significant differences which could or should affect the
liability issue.
First, unlike section 11, the English statute does not hold the
issuer liable, but rather excludes it as a defendant.
Second, section 11(b) (3) (A) speaks directly to a duty on the
part of the defendant, as to the unexpertised portions of the
registration statement, to reasonably investigate. Thus, unlike
its English counterpart, section 37(1) (d) (iv), section 11 re-
quires affirmative investigation in order to establish innocence.
This may very well charge the section 11 defendants with a
higher standard than the defendants in an equivalent Companies
Act situation.
Third, although section 11 constantly refers to "untrue state-
ments" as a basis for liability, as does section 37 of the Com-
panies Act, it specifically includes reference to liability arising
also from the "omission to state a material fact required to be
stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading . . 21 Neither section 37, Companies Act, 1929, nor
section 43, Companies Act, 1948,78 make reference to omission in
76. 283 F. Supp. at 701.
77. Supra notes 22 & 23.
78. 11 & 12 Geo. VI.
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either of the contextual settings aforementioned. This too, on its
face, seems to expand the section 11 defendant's liability.
But uniquely enough the English seem to have a more stringent
requirement as regards the non-expert's liability for the state-
ments and reports made by an expert. In the 1929 Act, section
37(1) (d) (iv) (b)&(c), 79 the defendant could be held for the in-
competence of the expert. At that time the burden was on the
plaintiff affirmatively to show that the defendant had no rea-
sonable ground to believe that the expert was competent to make
a report. The Companies Act, 1948, reversed the point in regard
to burden of proof at section 43 (2) (d) (ii) 80 and Chitty's Annual
Statutes 1 makes the comment:
As regards the liability of other persons for untrue
statements in an expert's report the onus is now shifted
to them to establish that they believed the expert com-
petent to make the report.
8 2
Section 11 makes no affirmative requirement that the non-
expert determine the competency of the expert. They are charged
only with the burden of proving that they had no reasonable
ground to, and did not, believe that anything in the expertised
portion of the registration statement was untrue.8 3
This distinction between Acts has great significance for several
reasons. The defendants in a section 11 action are not charged
by the Act to ascertain the competency of any expert, including
the accountant. Since accountants, for the purpose of the
registration statement, must be independent, the issuer's man-
agement, if attempting to hide something, may not be disposed
to employ one of high calibre.
Further, the question of competency is a question of degree.
Certainly a factor in establishing this degree would be the
amount of experience the particular accountant has. This could
have been a critical factor in BarChris where one of the auditors
doing most of the auditing work and investigation was neither
a Certified Public Accountant, nor seasoned with experience.
The Companies Act addresses itself, through section 43 (3) (c)
to the experts' liability, indicating that the possibility of liabil-
79. Supra note 22.
80. Supra note 78.
81. 42 Chitty's Annual Statutes, 11 & 12 Geo. VI, § 43 (1948).
82. Id.
83. Section 11(b) (3) (C) (1964), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (3) (C) (1964).
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ity on the part of the expert is enhanced if he cannot show, in
his defense, that he woas competent to make Ms report.8 4 Again,
with reference to BarOhris, and if section 11 had a comparable
provision, the accountants would have had to prove not only
the competence of the firm, but the competence of the particular
individual doing the work. This would be perhaps as it
should be.
The reasonable investigation language of section 11(b) (3) is
qualified by section 11(c) which reads as follows:
[I]n determining, for the purpose of paragraph (3) of
subsection (b) of this section, what constitutes reason-
able investigation and reasonable ground for belief, the
standard of reasonableness shall be that required of a
prudent man in the management of his own property.,
There is a footnote to this section indicating that it had been
amended from its initial reading which had set the standard of
reasonableness as that of a prudent man occupying a fiduciary
relationship.86
That the change in the definition may not significantly affect
the duties imposed upon those listed in section 11(a)8 7 imports
the query as to whether section 11 (c) in its present language is
not surplus verbiage in the first place. There is no counterpart
of section 11 (c) in either the 1929 or 1948 Companies Acts. We
must keep in mind also that there is no express duty to investi-
gate in either Act, yet as we shall see from Adam& v. Thrift,s8
an English case, these elements may be automatic implications.
The purpose of the 1934 change was to "avoid the possibility
of an over-zealous judicial construction of the term 'fiduciary
relationship' ", though in truth the amendment was probably
unnecessary. Indeed, Professor Loss states:
Largely for psychological reasons, so it seems, Congress
also changed the 'standard of reasonableness,' with re-
spect to investigation and ground for belief, from 'that
required of a person occupying a fiduciary relationship'
84. For the 1929 provision see Companies Act, 1929, note 22 supra, at sec-
tion 37(1) (iv) (c).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (1964).
86. Amended by Public Act No. 291, 73d Cong. H.R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1934).
87. See 3 Loss, Szctwmans RaurAioN 1726 (1961).
88. [1915] 2 Ch. 21 (C.A.). See notes 113-14 infra, and accompanying text.
[Vol. 'a
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to 'that required of a prudent man in the management
of his own property.' This is substantially the standard
adopted in the Restatement of Thusts and applied under
the English Companies Act; the English courts recog-
nize that a director may rely on clerks and other com-
petent persons for information concerning the business,
but do not regard reliance on the statements of pro-
moters or approval of the prospectus by other directors
as a defense. Indeed, even under the original 'fiduciary'
standard, the conference report on the bill which became
the Securities Act recognized that a fiduciary need not
'individually perform every duty imposed upon him,'
but may delegate to others 'the performance of acts
which it is unreasonable to require that the fiduciary
shall personally perform,' especially 'where the char-
acter of the acts involves professional skill or facilities
not possessed by the fiduciary himself.8 9
In light of Ba'Cvris one wonders just how much delegating
can be done and to what extent the directors may rely on clerks
or professionals in garnering information during an investiga-
tion. For instance, may a director rely on the company's account-
ant or the independant accountant's uncertified figures such as
were contained in the 1961 BarChris financials?
As to the non-expertised portions, however, Auslander
is in a different position. He seems to have been under
the impression that Peat, Marwick was not correct...
Auslander made no investigation for the accuracy of the
prospectus.90
But even when reliance is not placed on an expert 91 or a pro-
fessional there certainly will be instances when the director
ought not to rely on other company personnel. The dangers are
obvious: Employees may stand in a favored position with the
89. See Loss, supra note 87. See also, Douglas & Bates, Some Effects of the
Securities Act upon, Investment Banking, 1 U. CH. L. Rxv. 283 (1933).
90. 283 F. Supp. at 688. But, cf., Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 677 (Sup. Ct.
1940) ; Stevens v. Hoare, 20 T.L.R. 407 (Ch. 1904). See notes 93-95 infra.
91. A corollary question arises as to whether the outside director may dele-
gate the duties of investigation to an outside investigation service and thus sat-
isfy his due diligence defense. See Note, Securities Act of 1933-Misleading
Prospectus-Directors' Liability Under Section 11-Due Diligence Defense, 42
T~mPL L.Q. 81, 86 (1968). The question more properly relates to the issues of
"hedging" (see note 48, supra, and accompanying text) and indemnification (see
notes 185-93 infra, and accompanying text). Suffice it to say for the moment,
that employing such services would be a positive factor in favor of the director,
but total reliance on the findings of such service would seem to be unreasonable
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insiders and consequently will protect or be influenced by them;
employees will often tell the directors only what they think the
directors want to hear; employees, as well as management, are
not willing to disclose unfavorable information which may
reflect upon them, their fellows, or the officers.
Much more fascinating is the application of section(c) and
the question of delegation as concerns underwriters.
Judge McLean stated that "The underwriters are just as
responsible as the company if the prospectus is false." 92 While
the judge was not really holding the underwriters as "insurers"
as section 11 nearly treats the issuer, he did not define what a
reasonable underwriter's investigation would be, nor did he ex-
plore section 11(c) further than holding that a prudent man
would have made a more extensive investigation than did under-
writer's counsel and since the underwriters delegated the task to
counsel they were bound by his failure.
The underwriters did not argue reliance upon their counsel,
but rather argued Litwin v. Allen,93 a case which held that a
director of a corporation may rely upon information furnished
him by the officers of the corporation without independently
verifying it, and they stated that this was analogous to the
underwriters' position with the company. It was their contention
that the case established a standard of reasonableness for the
reasonably prudent director and that the same should be the
standard for the reasonably prudent underwriter under the Act.
The argument was rejected on two grounds:
1. New York law does not govern the case. "The construction
of the Securities Act is a matter of federal law."
94
2. The two situations are not analogous. "An underwriter has
not put the company's officers 'into a position of trust for the
express purpose of attending to details of management.' The
underwriters did not select them. In a. sense, the positions of the
underwriter and the company's officers are adverse." 95 It is
not unlikely that statements made by the company officers to
an underwriter to induce him to underwrite may be self-serving.
Some guidelines as to the delegation of duties is found within
the basic law of trusts. A trustee has a standard duty to dis-
92. 283 F. Supp. at 696.
93. 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
94. 283 F. Supp. at 696.
95. Id.
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charge his trust obligations in good faith, with the competence
of a prudent man in the management of his own property, 6
and when the trustee possesses special or exceptional skills or
has access to more extensive facilities, he will be held to a higher
standard at least to the extent that he holds himself out as
being possessed of these special qualities.9 7 As already noted,98
there may be a delegation of duties to another under the fiduci-
ary standard where it would be unreasonable for the investigator
to perform the acts personally, especially when the delegation
is to one possessed of greater skills than the delegator.99
If the underwriters are truly adverse to the issuer then there
can be no delegation to, and concommitant reliance upon, any
of the officers or directors of the issuer. Further, since the
matters to be investigated are factual in nature there ought not
to be any delegation of duties to an attorney, since not only is
the underwriter possessed of the same skills as the attorney, but
such delegation would seem unreasonable under all the circum-
stances.100
Unlike the attorney, the underwriter's stock in trade is fi-
nancial analysis. Besides employing skilled men in this area
the underwriter has extensive facilities at its disposal, all of
which are centered around market and financial analysis.
What seems clear is that the underwriter plays an important
integral role in the investigatory schemework of section 11.
While it is doubtful that he could delegate any of this responsi-
bility it is truly unclear as to just how extensive a role he should
play.10
1
It seemed impossible to define in statutory language
the extent to which a fiduciary might lawfully delegate
96. See RESTATEMMNT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959) (loyalty); id.
§ 174 (competence); cf. H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1933)
("a duty of competence as well as innocence"). Note, Escott v. BarChris:
"Reasonable Investigation" and Prospectus Liability under Section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933, 82 HAnv. L. Rnv. 908, 911 (1969).
97. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 174. Note, Escolt v. Bar-
Chris, id.
98. Supra notes 89-91, and accompanying text.
99. The investigator may discharge his responsibility if his reliance on the
delegate's performance is "reasonable in light of all of the circumstances". H.R.
Rep. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1933).
100. Id.
101. That they must investigate is clear. To the degree that they must in-
vestigate is unclear and is not aided by "federal law" except that decisions of
the SEC have indicated that underwriters must go beyond and behind the rep-
sesentations of the issuer. Matter of Richmond Corporation, 41 S.E.C. 398
(1963); Matter of Charles E. Bailey & Co., 35 S.E.C. 33 (1953).
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his duties to others. In lieu of such an effort, resort was
made to general language in the report to indicate that a
goodly measure of delegation was justifiable, particu-
larly insofar as corporate directors are concerned. 102
This section 11(c) "general language" proved fatal to the
underwriters in BarChris, and will continue to be fatal to all
underwriters absent some specific directions. This situation
makes propitious further legislative clarification.
B. Materiaity
The task of determining materiality has always been a diffi-
cult one and as Judge McLean indicated it was a difficult task
in BarC'hrks. The concluding remarks of the judge indicate the
dangers:
Since no one knows what moves or does not move the
mythical 'average prudent investor,' it comes down to a
question of judgment, to be exercised by the trier of the
fact as best he can in the light of all the circum-
stances.103
Indeed, once misstatements or omissions are shown to exist in
the prospectus, as for instance in the sales and contingent liabil-
ity figures in the BarChris 1960 financials, could not the trier of
fact easily find them to be material, especially when to do
otherwise would result in the denial of recovery by innocent
investors of lost funds? It would be the unusual case where the
plaintiff would not testify to the fact that he relied on the
particular false statements. Further, since the issue of material-
ity is subject matter for the triers of fact, one cannot help doubt
that other factors, such as the degree of culpability, will sub-
stantially influence the ultimate determination.
Be that as it may, a case against a finding of materiality can
be made. Professor Loss, in analyzing the various Rule 10b-5104
cases in which judgment for the plaintiff was rendered on the
merits, came to the conclusion that "material" probably means
"damn material" and that the courts, in essence, were applying
the "special circumstances doctrine".' 0 5
102. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEo.
WAs H. L. Rnv. 29, 48 (1959). See Loss, supra note 87.
103. 283 F. Supp. at 682.
104. Supra note 16.
105. Proceedings, American Bar Association National Institute, The Bar-
Chris Case: Prospectus Liability, 24 Bus. LAw. 523, 533 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as BarChris Conference].
[Vol. 21
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Other authorities have not felt -as strongly as Professor Loss
as to the substantiality of the materiality test:
[Miateriality, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder.
Note for example Judge McLean's suggestion that while
balance sheet discrepancies as of December 31, 1960,
if known to the prospective purchaser would have
deterred his purchase, discrepancies as to sales and earn-
ings were not sufficient to have had the same effect. I
have heard many a disagreement and there can be no
satisfactory and complete reconciliation. All I can
suggest is that counsel must approach the question of
materiality as if he were defending a corporate fiduci-
ary who under Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Company
[254 U.S. 590 (1921)] has the burden of proving the fair-
ness of his transaction with his corporation. Everything
is 'material' until the contrary is proven if not beyond a
reasonable doubt at least by a preponderance of the
evidence; or it is clearly established that its financial
significance is minuscule.1°6
One expert set forth specific criticisms of the court's deter-
mination of materiality:
The application of the materiality concept by the Court
to the facts of the BarChris case is at least somewhat
surprising. The Court concluded that the 14 percent
error in earnings for 1960 was not material . . . . I
daresay that any accountant who discovered that he
had made an error of 14% in the income statement
of a client would be horrified and very few would be in-
clined to dismiss such a discrepancy as 'immaterial' ....
[A] 14% discrepancy which reduces earnings from T5 a
share to 650 a share results in a $3.20 difference in
market price, to many people a not inconsequential dif-
ferential. In this particular it would appear that the
106. Statement of Carlos Isreals, id. at 539.
There was one other view concerning materiality as it was applied in Bar-
Chris that merits attention. It was one expert's contention that Judge McLean
had differentiated between materiality as to recent facts and materiality as to
more vintage facts. He pointed out that the Judge had indicated that the errors
in the 1960 financials were bad, but in essence ignored them to concentrate on
the 1961 unaudited financials, showing perhaps that the more historical facts
were less important and the more recent, as a consequence were "more ma-
terial". Statement of F. Arnold Daum, id. at 554-55.
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Court was conservative and that its conclusion might
be challanged....
It is submitted that the Court's conclusion that the
auditors were liable because of the error in the current
ratio, even if it is concluded the auditors were negligent
in the particulars the Court says they were, is incorrect.
The Court first remarked that the ratio . . . was 'bad
enough'. Was it so bad? Two-to-one is regarded as
something of a standard. In the construction industry
the median in 1959 was 1.81. Thus there is some ques-
tion whether the ratio in the balance sheet or even as
adjusted was as lamentable as the Court said.107
In the end analysis, as a practical matter, the problem of
materiality will probably be settled depending upon the par-
ticular merits of the case. Ordinarily any misstatement or omis-
sion will be held "material" enough to overcome a defendant's
motion for summary judgment and this alone is usually sufficient
to prompt settlement.
6'. Investigation and Verification-The Case in Historical
Perspective
1. The Directors' Duty to Investigate. Section 11 makes no dis-
tinction between inside and outside directors as to liability or as
to the degree of investigation necessary to sustain the burden
of proving due diligence. As previously discussed'"8 the general
standard as to what constitutes reasonable investigation and rea-
sonable belief set forth in section 11(c), is that which is required
of a prudent man in the management of his own property.
Before BarChris the standard was not stringently applied,10 9
107. Statement of A.A. Sommer, Jr., id. at 593, 598-599.
108. See notes 85-91 supra, and accompanying text.
109. See Martin v. Hull, 92 F.2d 208, 209-10 (D.C. Cir. 1937), cert. denied,
302 U.S. 726 (1937), where the plaintiffs unsuccessfully attempted to have the
court charge the jury that as a matter of law "if the defendants did not exer-
cise 'the high degree of care necessary in the protection of the interests of the
stockholders of the Corporation, then they have not acted as reasonably pru-
dent men would have acted'." Section 11(c) was read to the jury. Two com-
ments can be made as to the decision: one, the decision does not indicate, since
the jury did not, whether the defendants had sustained their section 11 (b) (C)
defense on the section 11(c) interpretation, or whether the jury had held for
them on the defense that the plaintiffs knew of the misstatement at the time of
acquisition (the appellate court indicated that evidence was tendered to show
such knowledge) ; and two, the only section 11(b) defense was that based on
misstatements in the "expertized" portion of the registration statement and thus
section 11(c) as it related to section 11(b) reasonable investigation, was not
considered.
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but it was always assumed that the director would no longer
have merely a perfunctory role to perform:
The Act imposes a minimum duty on all directors which
would 'have a direct tendency to preclude persons from
acting as nominal directors' and 'result in persons retir-
ing from many boards and confining their efforts to a
few boards where they will actually direct."10
As with the underwriters, the directors, although under a
mandate to reasonably investigate, are left without guidelines
indicating the necessary extent of the investigation required of
them.
It is interesting to note that the directors, unlike the under-
writers, did not argue the applicability of the case of Litwin .
Allen,"' although the principles announced in the case were
more applicable to the directors than to the underwriters.
Litwin, as recalled, stood for the proposition that a director may
rely upon information furnished him by the officers of the
corporation without independently verifying it. 112 Since Litwin
was not argued in proper context, i.e., in relation to the directors,
it was not expressly rejected by the court as having no sub-
stantive force in formulating section 11 doctrine, although the
court leaves little doubt that if the issue had been raised by the
directors it would have been rejected in favor of the Adams v.
Thrift"3 principle. Following the mandate of Adams, Judge
McLean held that directors could not rely on the representations
of management." 4
110. S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933). See BarChris, Due Dil-
ligence Refined, supra note 9, and Douglas & Bates, Some Effects of the Se-
curities Act Upon Investment Banking, U. CHI. L. R v. 283, 291, n. 29 (1933).
111. Supra note 90. See also accompanying text.
112. See N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 717 (McKinney 1963) which codifies
this principle.
113. Supra note 88.
114. Judge McLean placed heavy emphasis on Adams, to the exclusion of
domestic decisions, in holding the outside directors liable for failing to investi-
gate to a degree required of a prudent man in the management of his own af-
fairs, even though as already mentioned neither the Directors' Liability Act,
1890, nor the Companies Act, 1929, has a prudent man provision. In Adans, a
suit by a stockholder against the directors for false misstatements in the pros-
pectus, the court seemed to imply that the defendant-directors could have sus-
tained their defense if they had collectively investigated, and failing that, if
they had individually investigated:
Had the board here collectively made or set about making an in-
vestigation such as I have indicated, and had that investigation led
to a report that the statements were found on fact and were sub-
stantially true, there is little doubt but that each member of the
board might and would have been held to have had reasonable
ground for entertaining the belief that the statements were true.
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Even assuming for the moment that Litwin still has vitality,
the rationale for its holding can be clearly distinguished from
that underlying the BarChri decision, by analyzing the roles
the directors played in the various transactions involved in the
two decisions.
Where the directors, as in Litwin, are merely approv-
ing a corporate transaction... their interests are com-
pletely identified with those of the corporate manage-
ment in that the only interests at stake are those of the
corporation itself. The complexity of the transaction
may make it virtually impossible for the directors to
analyze independently the thinking which goes into such
transactions....
When the director is considering only a transaction
which effects [sic] the management and operations of
the corporation itself, he may reasonably rely on repre-
sentations of management, except to the extent that his
own personal familiarity with the operations of the
company arouses in him suspicions which he ought to
eliminate by independent verification. On the other
hand, where the outside director is charged with the
duty of lending his name and reputation to representa-
tions about the existing status of the company, on which
the investing public will necessarily rely, he must place
himself in the shoes of the shareholders and of the in-
Id. at 565 (emphasis added).
While investigation is not expressly required under the English law, nonethe-
less to establish reasonable belief in the statements, there must be corroboration
of the facts which consequently requires investigation.
The statement on "collective investigation" has broader implications than the
case allowed, for the court throughout had held that none of the defendants
had any foundation for believing that any of the others knew more than they,
which was relatively little:
Dr. Clarke's evidence shows that he unfortunately did not ap-
preciate the duties and obligations he was undertaking as a direc-
tor, and personally he had seen nothing in the conduct of his co-
directors calculated to lead him to conclude that they appreciated
more than he did the duties and obligations of his office. As I
have said, collectively they had done nothing; ...
Id. at 568.
Had some of the directors, besides showing an expertise in the company, under-
taken an investigation, would the others be able to rely on their findings and
representations? The court in Adams speaks to this possibility. Whether the
court intentionally considered the thought, the concept of "collective investiga-
tion" might be a feasible potential alternative to the burden of individual in-
vestigation as dictated by BarChris. Of course, some refinements would be in
order to stay within the policy of BarChris, such as segregating the outside
directors from the inside directors and holding each group to separate stand-
ards.
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vesting public (the potential shareholders of the com-
pany) and satisfy himself independently that each
representation has a firm factual basis. Thus, the role
of the director in federal securities law is distinctly
different from his role in the case of an ordinary corpo-
rate transaction which he is called upon to approve.115
The above analysis is also consistent with the English position
which allows directors to rely on knowledgeable employees and
clerks for information concerning the company,116 but does not
extend the defense to the director when he relies on others for
information placed in the prospectus."1 7
Regarding the crucial question of the degree of investigation,
as opposed to the issue of delegation, the House and Senate
early disagreed."18 It was the Senate's desire to hold the issuer,
directors, chief executive and financial officers somewhat as
insurers. On the other hand the House bill measured liability
in terms of reasonable care, placing upon the defendants the
duty of proving reasonable care as to the accuracy of statements
in the registration statement. By the time the Act was adopted
the general consensus was that not all individuals would be
held to the same standard of care, that the degree of reasonable-
ness depended upon the importance of each individual's place
in the distribution process and the degree of protection the
public expected from him.' 19
Also, at the time of adoption, there were express statements to
the effect that not all directors should be held to the same
standard,' 20 nor should all underwriters be held to the same
standard as the managing underwriter. 121 Some of these authors
felt that as to the outside directors, the standard should be kept
to a bare minimum. There is no doubt but that long standing
business practices had influenced this position. The flavor of
this strong attitude can best be gleaned by the following state-
ment:
115. Statement of T.G. Meeker, BarChris Conference, supra note 105, at 573,
581-82.
116. Stevens v. Hoare, supra note 90.
117. Adams v. Thrift, supra note 88.
118. H.R, Rep. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1933).
119. H.R. Rep. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1933).
120. Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act, 43 YALa L.J. 171, 193
(1933).
121. Landis, Liability Sections of the Securities Act Authoritatively Dis-
cussed, 18 A. ACCOUNTANT 330, 332 (1933), and 3 Loss, ScurazEs Rxa uLA-
T ON 1726 (1961).
1-969]
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Aa with the other persons made liable on the registra-
tion statement, the risks to directors increase with the
size and complexity of the issuer's operations. Fur-
thermore, though there may be some or many directors
who do not 'direct' (in the sense that they merely draw
prestige and fees from the position) there are a great
many, particularly of the larger and more complicated
enterprises, who do and yet are not personally familiar
with all details of operation. Nor could their services
be obtained in most cases if they were required to in-
vestigate details of the enterprise. The experience and
judgment of men of affairs is of great value to most of
our more important corporations. To deprive enter-
prises of this asset would seem uneconomic in view of
the slight gains which may be expected. It is possible
to safeguard the accuracy and completeness of the
registration statement without subjecting every director
to the burden of proof that after reasonable investiga-
tion he had reasonable ground for believing and did be-
lieve the registration statement to be free from action-
able untruths or omissions.
1 22
Yet, even in the face of this somewhat prevailing attitude of
the day there were premonitions that a change was hopefully to
be effectuated as evidenced by the Congress's hope of having
persons resign from several boards and confining their efforts
to a few boards where they would actually direct.1 23 The phi-
losophy in holding all directors liable, notwithstanding possible
distinct standards among them, is best evidenced by the follow-
ing excerpt from a 1933 Senate report:
If one of two presumably innocent persons must bear a
loss, it is a familiar legal principle that he should bear
it who has the opportunity to learn the truth and has
allowed untruths to be published and relied upon.124
122. Douglas & Bates, supra note 120, at 195-96. The authors qualified this
position by suggesting that adequate regulatory legislation is needed for the
protection of the corporation and the minorities in cases where directors have
used their position merely as a social badge or as an advantageous trading
position. They concluded: "It is doubtful, however, if that end has any dom-
inant place in a securities act." Id. at 196.
123. Supra note 110.
124. S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933). See Note, Escort v.
BarChris Construction Corporation: Section 11 Strikes Back, 21 STAN. L
REv. 171, 183 (1968).
[Vol. 2f
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Although there appears to be no relevant data on the subject,
it is probably safe to assume that the practice of electing outside
"non-directing" directors to the board, at least prior to BarChrls
was as widespread as ever due primarily to the vast increase in
the number of corporations in existence. To this must be added
the vast increase in the number of public offerings where in a
majority of cases the company elects or appoints to the board an
individual connected with the managing underwriter. Barfhris
notwithstanding, section 11 had not lived up to expectations.
The distinction between the duty of an inside director and
outside director is implicitly, if not expressly clarified by the
BarChris court's treatment of the several directors. First, all the
directors who actually engaged in the operation of the corpora-
tion's affairs were presumed to have had the complete knowledge
of one ordinarily in that position. If such knowledge and
familiarity is relevant to expertised portions of the registration
statement the director will have a correspondingly more difficult
task proving he had no reasonable ground to believe that any of
the statements contained therein were untrue. This is evidenced
by the court's ruling that the chief financial officer and comp-
troller had failed to establish their belief in the truth of the
financials and as a consequence were held liable as to the ex-
pertised portions of the registration statement.
As to a reasonable investigation of the non-expertised por-
tions the court was less succinct in making a distinction between
the inside and outside directors, ultimately holding them all
liable under the same standard based on the, fact that none had
made an investigation. But again, it would appear that the in-
sider will have a correspondingly more difficult task in sustain-
ing his burden simply because of his familiarity, or presumed
familiarity, with the corporate affairs and operation. It might
be that nothing short of a wholesale investigation by the insider
will relieve him of liability, where as in the case of the outside
director a reasonable investigation may be established by a show-
ing that minutes of the parent and subsidiary corporations were
read, the major contracts studied, and the account books, order
books and other important corporate documents examined. In
addition to this, there of course must be a showing by the di-
rector that he read and was familiar with the registration state-
ment.
But this may be a too simple reading of BarChlr, at least as
concerns the outside director. One inescapable conclusion must
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be reached: there must be more than just an investigation, there
must be verification based upon personal knowledge and this
belies another factor, the vitality of which may have been
prophesied by way of dictum as early as 1937, where, in Martin
v. Hull," 5 the court, after discussing the -requirement of reason-
able investigation stated:
All these [directors, etc.] are liable to the buyer not only
if they cannot prove they did not know of the flaw in
the information offered the public but also if they
cannot prove that they could not have found that flaw
'after reasonable investigation'. .. . This tArow upon
originators of securities a duty of competence as well
as in'nocence.126
A proper investigation is going to require an expertise on the
part of the director of the operation of the business. One could
not intelligently examine contracts, factoring agreements, or for
that matter the minutes of the parent and subsidiary corporations
and hope to glean their significance without some sophistication.
The facts of BarChris illustrate this point well. For instance,
Judge McLean states that had the minutes of the subsidiaries
Bridge and Yonkers Lanes been read the fact that BarChris was
about to operate them would have been disclosed.127 If this fact
were known to the two outside directors, Auslander and Rose,
would it have had an impact upon them? The court held that the
failure to disclose the possibility of operating these two alleys
was a material misstatment in that BarChris was not described
as an operator of alleys in the description of business portion of
the registration statement.12 8 Further, Bridge and Yonkers
were included in sales for the first quarter of 1961 (the un-
audited figures) and thus caused an overstatement in sales which
was held to be a material misstatement.12 9 The Bridge transac-
tion was a complex transaction where BarChris ultimately
acquired the stock of the purchasing company.1 30 There had in
fact been a contract in 1960, and a portion of the selling price of
that contract was held to be properly included in sales in the
1960 figure under the percentage of completion method. How
were these two directors, one of them an engineer, to know that
125. Supra note 109.
126. Id. at 210 (emphasis added).
127. 283 F. Supp. at 691.
128. Id. at 678.
129. Id. at 668.
130. Id.
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the acquisition of the Biel Land Development Co. stock (the
original purchaser of Bridge) converted the transaction into an
intracompany one as of March 31, 1961? With Yonkers Lanes
the court stated that the executive committee minutes on March
18, 1961, would have indicated that there was no contract for this
center, but it wasn't until May 4, 1961, that BarChris formed a
subsidiary which eventually operated Yonkers."3 1
Whether the outside directors would have discovered these
flaws is a matter for speculation. Suffice it to say for the
moment that sophistication and competence may well play a
major role in determining whether a sufficient investigation had
been made. This belief is grounded on a literal interpretation
and analysis of section 11 (c) and its attendant trust law implica-
tions. A reasonable investigation is that required of a prudent
man in the management of his own property. Could a director,
after having shown a relatively extensive investigation, state to
the court that the lack of business acumen or lack of acumen in
the particular business was the cause of his failure to uncover
the flaws? Would this not be a request to stretch the mandate
of section 11 (c) beyond proportion?
It will not be argued here that both insiders and outsiders
should, or could, be held to the same standard; obviously, the
insider is going to have a much heavier burden to carry, and
justifiably so. But nevertheless, such hypothecation can be dan-
gerous and misleading, as is every generalization. The fact that
the insider has a heavier burden will not lighten the load to be
carried by the outsider.
It seems to the writer that Judge McLean was correct in
initially holding each director, new or old, to the same standard,
increa&in the burden of each according to his exposure in pre-
paring the registration statement and his exposure to the machi-
nations of the business. Neither inside nor outside director can
claim a lack of expertise or competence as regards ordinary busi-
ness procedures, but the outside director may escape liability on
the uniqueness or complexity of a particular transaction if he can
show that a reasonable investigation would not necessarily have
disclosed the flaw, whereas an insider, involved directly in the
transaction, could not avail himself of this defense.
The above reasoning would seem to hold especially true to the
attorney-director situation, although the BarCkhs court had
131. Id.
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little difficulty in finding that the attorney-director failed to do
even some of the things that the ordinary outside director should
have done.
Two points ought to be emphasized. One, the director-at-
torney, who also prepares the registration statement, is in a pre-
carious position, in that he will probably have to prove that he
was quite familiar with all aspects of the business, and his lack
of competence or knowledge will not only prove to be no defense,
but rather will emphasize his duty to be more sophisticated as to
the corporation's affairs. Two, the director-lawyer who does not
prepare the registration statement probably stands in the same
shoes as any other outside director, unless it is shown that he,
because of his professional acumen, had acquired a more particu-
larized knowledge of the corporation. A collateral question is
raised as to investor reliance upon the particular director because
of his professional status. Will potential investors glean from
the prospectus that the director is an attorney as well and does
this result in added reliance? Will the ordinary investor assume
that when playing the role of director the attorney lends his
professional criticism to transactions of the corporation or gives
his professional blessings to those transactions?
Lastly, does his very position of trust in the community as an
attorney carry over in giving respectability to the board and thus
add dignity to the prospectus? These questions highlight the
dangers facing not only attorney-directors, but others as well
who are possessed of special qualities.
In a recent article the contention was made that the ordinary
investor would not rely on a director who had been elected to the
board only one month before the effective date of the registra-
tion statement:
These men had a most peripheral place in the scheme of
distribution and were not really in a position to afford
the investor much additional protection.132
This contention belies the fact that an investor may give
greater weight to the name, reputation, expertise or business
acumen of the director, rather than to the length of his service.
Indeed, the name of a respected financial figure would seem to
have a greater effect upon the investor than would the name of
132. Comment, BarChris: Due Diligence Refined, 68 COLIm. L. REv. 1411,
1417 (1968).
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some obscure hard working, well-informed director. Congress
has already indicated that investor reliance dictates the im-
portance of the role to be played by each individual iA the dis-
tribution process. 18 3  To possibly avoid this potential added
burden it is suggested that the prospectus specifically indicate
what directors are "outside", what it is that they actually con-
tribute to the corporation by way of guidance, and if they possess
special capacity whether this capacity is being specifically uti-
lized by the corporation. 3 4
2. The Underwitere' Duty to Investigate. Judge McLean's
decision, so far as it concerned the underwriters in BarChrls,
should have come as no surprise; indeed, unlike the outside di-
rectors, the underwriters were specifically slated much earlier
than BarCh is, to have a special role in a public offering,115 and
this role was particularly characterized in two prior SEC
decisions.
As early as 1953, in Charles E. Bailey and Co.,13 6 the Com-
mission had stated that underwriters must be particularly careful
in verifying the issuer's self serving statements, especially when
there is a new and speculative venture to be financed, and espe-
cially when the statements concerned the issuer's operations and
prospects.
In Bailey, the underwriters' defense was based on a prelimi-
nary investigation of the company's affairs with the con-
tention that such investigation was sufficient to satisfy the
underwriters' duty. A further contention was that the under-
writers were not responsible for the contents of the prospectus,
since it contained information supplied by the issuer, on which
they were entitled to rely. The Commission specifically rejected
these contentions. 3 7
133. H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1933). See note 119 mipra.
134. Unlike those of the officers, the past business positions of directors need
not be indicated in the registration statement. See form S-1 (Registration
Statement under the Securities Act of 1933) Item 16 (rev. 1955) 1 CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. f[ 7123, at 6208. Note, Escort v. BarChris, supra note 96, at 918,
rn 51. The article makes the suggestion that new directors not be selected until
after the public offering. Id.
135. H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933). Therein underwriters
were characterized as fiduciaries, responsible for a high standard of care, com-
petence, and honesty.
136. 35 S.E.C. 33 (1953).
137. For an extensive discussion on the Bailey case with emphasis on the
Commission's treatment of the underwriter's defense see Israels, Edited Selec-
tions from the San Francisco Meeting, 18 Bus. LAw. 27, 32 (1962).
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In The Richmond Gorporatim,138 the Commission made it
even more clear that reliance upon the issuer's representations
did not satisfy the requirement of a diligent investigation into
the issuer's business and a verification of the accuracy of the
information contained in the prospectus. The underwriters' in-
vestigation in Richmond consisted of visits to two of the issuer's
three tracts of land, an examination of the stockholders' list and
the acquiring of a credit report on Richmond; "as to all other
matters in conjunction with the registration statement the under-
writers apparently relied only on representations of registrant's
management. Such limited investigation clearly did not measure
up to the degree of care and diligence required of an under-
writer. 1
39
Although Bailey and Richmond were actions dealing with sec-
tion 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 140 (broker-dealer
revocation) and section 8(d) of the Securities Act141 (stop order
proceedings) respectively, the standards enunciated in both are
and should be equally applicable to actions brought civilly under
section 11.
If a failure to make a reasonable attempt to verify the
data presented to the underwriters by the company of-
ficers is a sufficient basis for revocation of a broker-
dealer registration, it certainly seems sufficient to con-
stitute a basis for imposing the statutory liability of
section 11.142
The Richmond case provides even a richer source for com-
parison. The Commission there was directly concerned with a
false registration statement and ultimately issued a stop order
prohibiting the stock from being issued. The Commission, as
above noted, made a finding that the underwriters had failed to
perform their duty properly.
That Richmond and Baiey were precursors to BarChri8 leaves
little to speculation. Whether adjustments were made by the
underwriters as a consequence leaves a great deal to specu-
lation.143
138. 41 S.E.C. 398 (1963).
139. Id. at 405.
140. 15 U.S.C. 78o(b) (1964).
141. 15 U.S.C. 77h(d) (1964).
142. Supra note 132, at 1418.
143. From the survey taken of counsel, infra, there was every indication that
Richmond had no impact whatsoever.
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The pronouncements in the two cases were in no way revolu-
tionary, but rather were dictated by well-established guidelines.
In 1933 Congress defined the standard to be maintained by
underwriters.144  Viewed retrospectively, in light of the policy
statements of Congress, and the policy considerations advanced
by the SEC, there seemed to be little foundation for assuming
that the underwriters would be held to a lesser standard under
section 11; yet, the underwriters in BarChis attempted to argue
that the lesser standard existed by virtue of state corporation
law 145 making no attempt to overcome the broad postulations set
forth in Bailey and Richmond.
An underwriter, by lending his name and his reputation to
the offering, solicits from the public reliance and trust. By his
involvement the implication arises that an investigation has been
made by the underwriter, an investigation sufficient to satisfy
the underwriter as to the integrity and honesty of the issuer and
as to the accuracy and adequacy of the prospectus. 4 6
144. Supra note 135.
145. 283 F. Supp. at 696. Supra notes 93-95, and accompanying text.
146. Several lay books are written wherein the underwriters' role in investi-
gation for a public offering is described. D. H. BFL _sORE, INVESTMENTS:
PRINCIPLES, PRACICE AND ANALYSIS (2d ed. 1966) describes the extensiveness
of the investigation to the general investing public:
The Preliminary Investigation. If the originating investment bank-
er has not dealt previously with the issuer he may decide to make
a brief preliminary investigation, which may save the expense of a
complete investigation if the issuer is found to be unsatisfactory.
This investigation will include a review of the industry situation
and the company's position in the industry based on information
that is readily available. If the preliminary study is favorable and
the investment banker believes that further investigation is justi-
fied he will request assurance from the issuer that he is to have
first priority for the proposed underwriting. With this in hand, he
will initiate a complete, thorough, and far reaching investigation.
The Complete Investigation. The complete investigation is much
more comprehensive and may be broken down into an accounting
and financial section, an engineering section, a legal section and a
general section. Not only is the staff of the buying department fully
utilized, but outside accountants, engineers, and lawyers are fre-
quently called upon to supplement the work of the buying staff in
the case of large issues. Frequently much of the information is
handled by representatives of the issuer and then checked by the
originating investment banker.
Id. at 203 (emphasis added).
See also as to the underwriter's reputation and public reliance, C. Isaw.s &
G. DuFF, WHEN CORPORATIONS Go PuBLIC 43 (1962); BADGER, TORGERSON &
GUTHMAN, INVESTMENT PRINCIPLES & PRACTICES 89 (1961) ; ROBINSON, GOING
PuBLIc 20-21 (1961) ; DONALDSON, CoRPORATr FINANCE 398 (1957) ; Gourrick,
Investment Banking Methods Prior to and Since the Securities Act of 1933,
4 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 44, 46-47 (1937) ; Douglas & Bates, Some Effects of
the Securities Act of 1933 Upon Investment Banking, 1 U. CHi. L. REv. 283-84
(1933); cf., United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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Even as an ordinary business venture between the underwriter
and the issuer, especially in a complete undertaking, where full
financial responsibility is placed with the underwriter, as op-
posed to a "best efforts" underwriting, the underwriter should
do no less than thoroughly investigate for its own financial safety
irrespective of investor considerations. As indicated in Rich-
mond, citing United St ates v. Morgan,1 4 7 an antitrust suit under
the Sherman Act, wherein the defendants jointly issued a state-
ment as to the standards and practices of investment houses:
The first step of the investment banker,... is to make
an investigation of the company, including among other
things its corporate and capital structure, its present
and future financial needs and its financial condition.
The investigation itself is usually very extensive and
detailed, and involves extended conferences with the
issuer's officers, counsel, and accountants. It involves a
complete review and analysis of the financial statement
of the issuer for a considerable period in the past, and
it involves going behind such statements to appraise
the true value of the assets shown.1
48
Judge McLean, although stating that no rigid rule could be set
concerning the degree of investigation to be made by the under-
writers,140 made it crystal clear that the underwriters' position
was adverse to the issuer and as such no reliance could be placed
on any of the representations of the issuer's officers. 50 Thus, it
is reasonable to assume that in order to follow the court's man-
date a complete independent investigation must be made by the
underwriters. Holding the underwriters to this high standard
does not make them "guarantors" ;1ri quite to the contrary, a rea-
sonably diligent investigation into "material" areas, with in-
dependent verification of management's representations could
satisfy section 11 (b), absolving the underwriters from liability
even as to misrepresentations not uncovered. Of course, this
assumes that the investigation and verification was performed
in a competent manner. But no investigation or only a partial
investigation will automatically result in liability at least to the
extent that the underwriters will be liable for all misrepresenta-
tions which a "proper" investigation would have uncovered.
147. 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
148. Id. at 655.
149. 283 F. Supp. at 697.
150. Id. at 696.
151. S.E.C. Release No. 3-45, Sept. 22, 1933, 11 Fed. Reg. 10947.
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Further, since it is speculative whether such investigations
"could" have in fact uncovered the misrepresentation doubt wil
usually be resolved in favor of the plaintiff on the presumption
that an investigation into those matters "would" have revealed
the inaccuracy.
The danger to underwriters, and to outside directors as well, as
previously pointed out, is that they may be liable for misrepre-
sentations that reasonable and diligent investigation may not
have uncovered. Thus, the degree of investigation is largely for
personal determination. The underwriter must investigate those
areas which he knows or feels are "material" and on which
the investor will place reliance.
Judge McLean held the "group" underwriters liable for
Drexel's failure to conduct a reasonable investigation.152 The
facts were indisputably clear that the underwriters conducted
no investigation apart from the managing underwriter. The
decision came as no shock to the group for two reasons: one,
section 11 makes no distinction between the managing and other
underwriters; and two, it is common practice, when there is
more than one underwriter, which is the usual case, to have the
managing underwriter conduct the entire investigation.15 3 The
only obligation of the group is to contribute to the financing,
that is, to assume the obligation for a portion of the offering.
The group is usually resolved to stand or fall with the managing
underwriter as the case may be. As we shall see later, in the
survey, this attitude has not changed appreciably.
The only "investigation" undertaken by the group was at the
customary due diligence meeting,'5 wherein the underwriters
questioned certain of the officers, the issuer's counsel, and the
accountant. The due diligence meetings are thought to be worth-
less by many, serving only to give underwriters selling informa-
tion about the company.155
Whether it is more profitable for the group underwriters to
stand or fall with the lead underwriter is again a highly specula-
152. 283 F. Supp. at 697.
153. See note 146, "upra.
154. See Trial Memorandum No. 2 of Defendant Underwriters and D. B.
Coleman at 73-74, Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), and Note, Escott v. BarChris, supra note 96, at 911, n. 20.
155. See Symposium of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business
Law of ABA, Current Problems of Securities Underwriters and Dealers, 18
Bus. LAW. 27, 42-43 (1962); BarChris Conference, supra note 105, at 542-43.
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tive question, for in BarCh i one of the group underwriters
contributed $70,000 as its portion of the settlement agreement.
Perhaps in the face of this, independent investigation or at least
representative participation in the investigation might prove to
be desirable for, again, two reasons:
1. Group underwriters will probably not be held to the same
standard of investigation as the managing underwriter providing
they undertake to make some investigation. Their names on the
prospectus no doubt elicit investor reliance and this alone would
dictate some duty. Certainly no investigation would prove to be
fatal in every instance.
2. The more dangerous question of whether the group under-
writers would be liable for failing to investigate, notwithstanding
the fact that the managing underwriter has sustained its burden,
was left open by the court since there was no necessity to make
that determination.'5 6 The fact that the court expressly recog-
nized the problem lends weight to the dangerousness of the
situation.
Some suggestions as an alternative to not investigating seem
apropos. Since the standard applied to them will probably be
lower, the group underwriters may be able to sustain their bur-
den by showing a concerted effort to check on the actions of the
lead underwriter and its counsel, and by requiring a more con-
centrated due diligence meeting wherein all of the key officers,
including all directors and division heads, would be required to
attend. At this meeting the entire S-1 should be reviewed.
As an alternative, a concentrated meeting should be had prior
to filing with a review meeting just before the effective date,
covering all of the red line changes. Of course, the underwriters
should attend, not just their analysts. Further, to avoid liability
for failing to investigate, where the lead underwriter is exoner-
ated, some agency relationship should be worked out so that it is
clear that the lead is performing the investigation on behalf of
all of the underwriters. Under the section 11(c) trust theory,
this may, given some investigation, be a proper delegation of
duties.
There is practical support for the aforementioned suggestions
and conclusions. It is common knowledge in the investment com-
munity and among many investors, that the managing under-
156. 283 F. Supp. at 697, n. 26.
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writer usually assumes the responsibility for the investigation.
Secondly, it would seem highly impractical for ten, twenty or
thirty separate underwriters to independently investigate into
the issuer's affairs. This, too clearly, would not only be an un-
reasonable burden on the underwriters with the concomitant
waste of capital and manpower, but would also constitute a bur-
den on the issuer, its officers, and the company counsel.
The issue of reliance by the investing public is once more
called to mind. While there surely is reliance based upon the
reputations of the various group underwriters, 157 the reliance
probably is not as great as that placed upon the managing
underwriter. The role of the group in the distribution process
should also be analyzed. That they play a major role is not in
dispute for they finance and distribute the securities. But since
their role in the investigative process is hampered by practicality
this message should be borne to the investors by way of the
prospectus so that reliance will not be so great.
In the last analysis it is evident that the best solution would be
found in further legislation or SEC action to delineate the duties
of the managing and the group underwriters. This necessity is
further emphasized by the limited pronouncement of the court
concerning the delegation of investigative duties to counsel by
the managing underwriter1 58 and the total lack of pronounce-
ment as to the propriety of group underwriters' delegation to the
managing underwriter. The flavor of the court's language could
lead one to believe that perhaps a delegation of duties is per-
missible and that had counsel performed an exemplary task of
investigation the managing underwriter would have escaped
liability, thus perhaps exonerating the group underwriters.
As previously indicated, there may be a delegation of the
performance of acts which it is unreasonable to require of the
investigator and there may be reliance and consequently a full
discharge of responsibility if the delegate's performance is rea-
sonable, in light of all the circumstances. 159 The Report further
indicates that delegation might be justified when the delegate
possesses skills or resources not possessed by the delegator.1oo
In any event the court failed or refused to expressly consider the
question of delegation.
157. See note 146, and accompanying text, supra.
158. Supra note 156, at 697.
159. Supra notes 89-90, 96-100, and accompanying text.
160. H.R. Rep. No. 152, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 26 (1933). See also note 89,
supra.
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There were two possible bases for the court's ruling the under-
writer bound by counsel's failure to properly investigate and
concomitantly rejecting the delegation theory. First, counsel in
its opinion letter disclaimed any effort to verify the data pre-
sented to it by the issuer.161 Reliance here on the delegate's
performance would certainly be unreasonable in light of the
fact that the underwriter made no attempt to verify either.
Secondly, perhaps the court, notwithstanding its language, took
a negative view to a delegation of duties where the same was
not warranted by any special circumstances indicating that
counsel was better equipped to investigate than the underwriter.
Indeed, in the instant case, as well as in the usual situation, the
attorney usually stands in no better position than the under-
writer in terms of business, analytical, or investigative expertise.
In fact, the underwriter usually has more facilities, manpower,
and experience to handle these matters. Finally, this position
may be strengthened by virtue of the fact that the delegate was
one not contemplated as a defendant under section 11 and thus
not directly accountable for his actions to plaintiffs under a
section 11 action.
A recent article takes the position that the court relied on the
second basis for its determination.162 It is submitted that the
court's language does not carry this weight nor, it is further sub-
mitted, if the question arises again, will the court look to the
unreasonableness of the delegation in preference to viewing
whether the performance was satisfactory. If satisfactory in-
vestigation is not shown by the defendant recovery will be
forthcoming irrespective of who performed the task, delegate or
delegator; conversely, if a satisfactory investigation is proven
it should not matter whether it was performed by the delegate or
161. 283 F. Supp. at 695.
In the course of the preparation of the Registration State-
ment ... we have had numerous conferences . . . and we have
raised many questions regarding the business of the Company.
Satisfactory answers to such questions were in each case given
us, and documents we have requested have been supplied. We are
of the opinion that the data presented to us are accurately reflected
in the Registration Statement and Prospectus and that there has
been omitted from the Registration Statement no material facts in-
eluded in such data. Although we have not otherwise verified the
completeness or accuracy of the information furnished to us ...
we have no reason to believe that the Registration Statement or
Prospectus contains any untrue statements .... (emphasis by the
court).
162. Note, Escott v. BarChris, supra note 96, at 914.
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the delegator. The article agrees to this as the outcome under
the trust theory.163
As stated previously, this point has signal importance both to
the managing underwriter and the group, for heavy reliance,
as a matter of ordinary business practice, is placed upon counsel
by the managing underwriter, and collaterally, great emphasis
and reliance are placed upon the manager by the group. Again,
and it cannot be too strongly emphasized, that total reliance in
every instance will be unwarranted. At best, only "acts", as in-
dicated by the House report, can be delegated.6 4
3. The Accountant8' Duty to Inve8tigate. The passage of
section 11 brought the accountants' liability into clear perspec-
tive, expressly excluding the previous common law requirements
of privity and scienter. Thus "the revolutionary change to be
wrought by legislation" as suggested by Judge Cardozo in
Ultramares Corporationv . Touche,165 was indeed so wrought in
1933. But the standard of care and competence supposedly
imposed on the accountants was severely weakened in an action
under section 11 against accountants in iS7onts v. HirZinm= e66
in 1939.
Under the common law a third party could not sue an account-
ant for negligence, but could sustain an action in deceit if fraud
was alleged and proven. In this regard an inference of fraud
for purposes of the deceit action could be supported by sufficient
evidence of gross negligence. 1 7 The Shonts decision appeared
to have carried section 11 no further than the common law by
holding the accountants to a very low standard of care. The
material omission in the registration statement, found by the
Shont8 court, was the failure to note that the issuer had obligated
itself to a yearly contingent liability of $35,000 on a lease,
whether or not the property covered therein was used or not.
The lease was entered into a week after the certified financial
statement date, but before the effective date, yet no mention of the
lease was made in a post effective amendment filed by the issuer.
Since no concrete agreement was reached before certification,
163. Id. at 915.
164. See RESTATMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 171, comment c (1959).
165. 255 N.Y. 170, 187, 174 N.E. 441, 447 (1931).
166. 28 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
167. See State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E2d 416
(1938). But these common law notions are rapidly changing. See Fischer v.
Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) and Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin,
284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968).
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and since the agreement was not called to their attention, nor
could they have discovered its existence by perusal of "the books
at their disposal", the accountants were exonerated. As noted
by several authorities, both within and without the accounting
profession, the court applied an uncommonly low standard to
the accountants, indeed, a standard below what was customary
in the profession, and thus has been highly criticized. 168
Although Shonts appeared to do no more than echo Ultra-
mares, and notwithstanding the fact that it was never expressly
overruled, neither the accounting profession at large, nor the
accountants in BarGhris, relied on it as authority. Indeed,
stricter standards concerning post effective certification investi-
gation, were enunciated early by a noted accountant, 69 postu-
lated by the accounting profession itself, 70 and put into practice
by the accountants through the vehicle of the S-1 Review.' 71
Of notable significance is Judge McLean's treatment of the
problem. While recognizing that the procedures and programs
employed by the accountants in BarChris conformed to generally
accepted auditing standards, he found the accountants' actions
did not comport with those standards in that the investigation
made was minimal and did not follow the established program
for an S-1 Review. Thus, BarChris did not reestablish "the
standards imposed on accountants at the level recognized in
their profession";172 it merely recognized them and found that
they had been violated in this instance, something which the
Shonts court failed to do.
One interesting facet of the decision was the court's accentua-
tion of "performance" by its reference to the inexperience of the
168. See 3 Loss, SECUIrIS REGULATION 1733 (1961); Comment, Account-
ant's Liability to Third Parties Under Common Law and Federal Securities
Law 9 B C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 137, 158 (1967); Note, Civil Liability Under
the Pederal Securities Act, 50 YALE L.J. 90, 98-99 (1940) ; Note, Accountants'
Liability for False and Misleading Financial Statements, 67 COLUm. L. REv.
1437 (1967). See also Note, Escott v. BarChris Construction: Section 11
Strikes Back, 21 STAN. L. REv. 171 (1968), citing at 183 Rappaport, Account-
ants' Responsibility for Events Occurring After the Statement Date: The
Shonts Case, 95 J. ACCOUNTANCY 332 (1953).
169. See Rappaport, Accountants' Responsibility for Events Occurring
After the Statement Date: The Shonts Case, 95 J. ACCOUNTANCY 332 (1953).
170. Committee on Auditing Procedure, American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 33, AUDITING
STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES 75-80 (1963).
171. Id. For an excerpt of Auditing Procedure No. 33, showing what should
be done during the post statement period see, A.A. Sommer, Jr., BarChris Con-
ference, supra note 105, at 593, Appendix B, page 609.
172. See Comment, supra note 132, at 1419.
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accountant responsible for the bulk of the auditing work. Was
the court intimating that in cases to come, when it is shown that
the correct procedures were properly followed, there may still
be liability based on negligence for failure to have discovered
the errors during the investigation ? Stated otherwise, an analy-
sis of the accountant's competence, experience and expertise
might be the ultimate consideration in determining whether the
accountant "knew or should have known" of the misstatement or
omission. If this be so, then section 11 would be brought into
line with the English Companies Act, which requires that com-
petency be expressly proven by the expert.
1 3
One more interesting point should be noted about the BarCJrls
case and accountants. While the court approved of the S-1
Review schedule used by Peat, Marwick (fashioned after the
Review suggested in Statements on Auditing Procedure No.
33), 174 it indicated that maybe more should be required than
the generally accepted auditing standard set forth therein.
Neither Procedure No. 33, nor the Peat, Marwick procedure
required any external inquiry by the accountants during the S-1
Review, unless, of course, during the course of the internal in-
vestigation something was discovered which would require ex-
ternal investigation, yet Judge McLean stated that had inquiry
been made to the factors the accountants would have discovered
most of the customer delinquencies and a listing of the same in
the prospectus would have cured a material misrepresentation.
This external inquiry was without the scope of the S-1 Review,
but as one expert intimated, there are circumstances which per-
haps would require an external investigation, although the same
usually is not done.175
Since the accountants are responsible for their figures as of
the effective date and not the date of certification and since they
need not endure a complete audit in the review, perhaps an
external investigation would not be too demanding. Procedure
No. 33 ought to be amended to include the same.
173. See notes 79 to 83, and especially note 84 with the accompanying text,
mtpra.
174. Supra notes 170-71.
175. See A.A. Sommer, Jr., BarChris Conference, .rnpra note 105, at 604-07.
For a discussion of the use of the standards developed by the American Insti-
tute of Certified Public Accountants see, Note, Accountants' Libilift for False &
Misleading Financial Statements, 67 CoLum. L. REv. 1437, 1464-6A (1967).
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V. THn ImPAcT or BARCEmS- A MAsunE oF TH
REAMON OF THE INVESTMT COM NITY
AND SoM PPAC=CAL IMPLICATIONS
Paradoxically, BarChrs raised more crucial questions than it
decided. The factual setting made the ultimate determination
relatively easy, yet the decision offered only skeletal guidelines
for the investment community to follow. The significance of the
decision itself was in dispute with many people stating that Bar-
Chris said nothing new; others were more pessimistic. To best
gauge the impact of BarChris a survey was taken of members
of law firms in four key cities, representing three major sections
of the country.170 The result of the survey showed significant
reaction and distinct attitudinal changes based not only on
BarChris, but on other recent cases as well, such as Globu v.
Law Researoh Sevice, Iw. 1 77 As a consequence, and since
Globus has a distinct relationship to BarCfhrks and section 11,178
the survey questionnaire was revised early in the survey to in-
clude questions concerning indemnification and insurance. While
the issue of indemnification was not before the BarChriS7 9 court
it is thought to be vital to the total spectrum of public financing.
176. The survey included 10 firms from Los Angeles, Miami, Boston, and
New York. Approximately 25 attorneys were polled.
177. 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); aff'd, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. f 92,
474 at 98,234 (2d Cir. 1969).
178. Id. at 199.
179. There were several cross claims in BarChris, but none were lodged by
the group underwriters against the managing underwriter, nor by the managing
underwriter against BarChris. Interestingly enough, no cross claim was filed
by the managing underwriter against its counsel. The cross claims were as
follows:
1. The Trustees in Reorganization (supra note 55) for BarChris Corp.
charged Vitulo, Pugliese, and Russo, the insiders, with fraud by their attempt-
ing to obtain repayment of loans made by them to the corporation and for at-
tempting creditor preference for others in close association with them.
2. Rose, an outside director, charged Peat, Marwick & Co., and its agent
KMrscher, with negligence and misrepresentation in persuading Rose to accept
a directorship with BarChris. (Rose pleaded State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst,
sipra note 167, wherein it was held that a director has a right to sue others if
they misrepresent, where the director relied upon their position and statements.)
The contention was that common law fraud and misrepresentation were not
abolished by the adoption of the 1933 Act. See Trial Memorandum of Defend-
ant Rose It Support of Motion to Plead Over Against Certain of the Defend-
ants, Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(Pleadings File).
3. All the investment bankers cross claimed against Vitulo, Russo, Pugliese,
Kirscher, Grant, and Peat, Marwick & Co.
4. Kirscher and Trilling claimed over against Vitulo, Russo, Pugliese, Birn-
baum Grant, and Peat, Marwick & Co.
5. Vitulo and Pugliese claimed over against Kirscher, Trilling, and Peat,
Marwick & Co.
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To best gain a perspective of the discussion to follow, the
questionnaire is set forth below in entirety. It should be kept in
mind that the questions are broadly based and that much in-
formation related hereafter was wrought from informal discus-
sion initiated from one question or another. Further, the survey
does not purport to be definitive in nature, nor does it claim to
have isolated the various personality, practice sophistication, or
other variables; its primary purpose was barometric in nature,
to ascertain the changes initiated by BarChs and to hopefully
glean the prevailing attitude in the industry.
StRvn Q EsTIONs
1. Have you had occasion to represent, in connection with a
public offering, one or more of the following: a. Issuer b. Under-
writer c. Director d. Any officer of the issuer? Before or after
April, 1968?
2. Have you ever been consulted by an accounting firm or
engineer in connection with matters concerning a public offer-
ing? Before or after April, 1968?
3. Are you familiar with the decision Escott v. BarChris Con-
stmation Corporation?
4. Are you familiar with the SEC decision of In re Bailey and
In re Richmond Corporation? At approximately what date did
you become familiar with them?
5. Do you have a written procedure which you follow when
making an investigation under section 11? a. Was this written
procedure in effect before April, 1968? b. If no written pro-
cedures, what guidelines are followed, if any? Have they
changed since April, 1968?
6. Are questionnaires given to the officers, directors, employees,
or controlling stockholders of the issuer? If so, has the content
of these questionnaires changed since April, 1968?
'I. What is the usual number of attorneys working on prepara-
tion of registration statement or in conducting the investigation?
Has this number changed since April, 1968?
8. What is the usual makeup of the attorneys in terms of
experience? Has this changed since April, 1968?
6. Birnbaum cross claimed Vitulo, Russo, Pugliese, Kirscher, Trilling, and
Peat, Marwick & Co.
7. Grant claimed over against Peat, Marwick & Co., as did Auslander.
No determination of any of these claims were made, the court having reserved
ruling. In the interim the defendants settled.
19691
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9. Are the same attorneys usually appointed to work on all
public offerings? Has this changed since April, 1968?
10. Approximate the number of meetings held with the issuer
stating who is usually requested or required to attend. Has this
changed since April, 1968?
11. Are due diligence meetings required; if so, how many and
when are they held in approximation with the effective date of
the registration statement? Has this changed since April, 1968?
12. What is the number of cold comfort letters required by
you? Has this number changed since April, 1968?
13. State briefly and in general terms what your investigation
consists of, naming what you would emphasize the most. Has
this changed since April, 1968?
14. Do you work closely with counsel for the other parties
involved in the public offering?
15. Have you standard instructions to give to the issuer, offi-
cers, directors, or underwriters with respect to the disclosure
necessary in a registration statement and as to their respective
duties? If so, how are they delivered: a. conference b. written
c. informally?
16. If you represent an issuer or underwriter would you now
require that all interim figures be certified by the accountants?
17. If you represented both issuer and either an inside director
or officer of the issuer would you suggest that the director or
officer obtain other counsel for the public offering?
18. If you represented an underwriter would you now advise
one of the partners of the underwriting firm against joining the
board of directors of the issuer? If not, would you advise that
he retain other counsel for the investigation?
19. If you represented a nominal or outside director would
you advise that he resign from the board before the offering?
Would your answer be different if the director were an attorney,
analyst, or other professional?
20. Do you as attorney have any contract, agreement, or under-
standing with your underwriter or issuer clients as regards your
liability in connection with the investigation? Has this changed
since April, 1968?
21. Do you think it advisable for every person liable under
section 11 to undertake his own independent investigation in
connection with a public offering?
[Vol. 21
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22. If you represented an underwriter, other than the manag-
ing underwriter, would you suggest an independent investigation
for that underwriter? What do you think his participation, if
any should be?
23. Would you suggest to your client that he obtain insurance
with respect to the particular offering?
24. Are you familiar with the Globus v. Law Research Bervice,
Inc. decision, particularly with the pronouncement concerning
indemnification of the underwriter? If not, what are your views
as to the validity of indemnification agreements in the event
of liability for a false or misleading prospectus?
25. If you are familiar with the Globus decision do you think
it will be expanded to exclude all indemnification agreements
made in connection with a public offering?
Some general notions were readily gleaned from the data:
1. All firms were in agreement that a reevaluation or revamp-
ing of investigation procedures was in order as a result of
BarChris, and in all instances either the "old" procedure was
rejuvenated or a specific procedure was developed. It is interest-
ing to note that where the response was "rejuvenation" there was
no written procedure followed and in most cases none adopted.
(See q.5.) For those firms creating a specific written procedure
to follow, either they formulated their own, or adopted, with
room for modification, one of the several checklists that have
been published.180
Some interesting "informal" guidelines were utilized by one
firm representing an issuer:
1. Spend three or four days with the company making
up the first draft of the S-1. 2. Don't spend too much
time with the president of the company, but rather seek
out the one who is most familiar with the company,
other than the president. Make sure it is not the largest
stockholder either and never the vice-president in charge
of sales. All of these individuals will try to "sell" you
and you will never change their posture. But you must
180. See Isreals, Offerings of New Securities, 18 Bus. LAW. 27, 37 (1962)
and Isreals, Checklist for Underwriters' Investigation-Addendum-1968-Escott v.
BarChris Construction Corp., Selected Articles on Fed. Sec. Law, ABA COR-
PoA TIoxs, BANKING AND BusInEss LAW SxcTiox 65 (1968), or Prentice Hall,
How to Guard Against the New Dangers That Face Corporate Officers, Di-
rectors, Accountants, Lawyers and Others Under BarChris and Related Cases
(printed for the ABA National Institute 1968).
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keep in mind that there must be reliance on someone,
notwithstanding Barlk?*, for in order to read the "ma-
terial" contracts and minutes you must get them all.
The best individual is usually the treasurer or secretary.
Seek out the one who seems most truthful. 3. Go over
the first draft with designated truthful person. The
first meeting is with a view to making the second draft
and you need not include all officers or underwriter. 4.
The second meeting with the second draft is big and
must include the president, vice-president, treasurer,
chief financial officer, accountants, key personnel and
the underwriters. And of course the accountant. This
usually takes at least two days because the president
keeps disappearing. At this meeting present the ques-
tionnaire to the officers and directors. Give memos to
certain individuals stating that they are responsible for
portions of the registration statement. This will make
them think they are responsible, make them feel im-
portant, and consequently make them concentrate on the
investigation. 5. The second draft will usually result
in the first printed proof. Send it to all accountants,
lawyers, officers and directors. At this time send a ques-
tionnaire to all big customers and suppliers of the issuer
to verify statements. 6. Third meeting is with full
group and it results in the second proof which usually is
filed.
2. Uniquely enough, only two of all polled had any prior
knowledge of the Bailey or Richmand cases; as a consequence
they readily admitted that the same had no effect on their pro-
cedures, nor on the type of advice given to their underwriter-
clients. (See q.4.) Everyone polled was familiar with Ba7'Chri
to varying degrees. (See q.3.) As previously stated, it was the
writer's contention that Bailey and RichAmond were precursors to
BarCh'ris and that they should have caused a tightening up of
procedures on the part of the underwriters, especially when the
issue was a new one, and the issuer relatively unseasoned.
3. All firms polled indicated a preference in employing well-
known national accounting firms to undertake the independent
audit, although it should be pointed out that most counsel for
the underwriters stated that the selection was ordinarily not
theirs to make. Two significant reasons for the prevailing atti-
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tude toward national firms were given. One, local firms tend to
be "too local", not having the broad experience desired by most
underwriters. To this add the fact that other underwriters are
more easily drawn to the group by the presence of a well-known
reputable national firm as independent accountant. Lastly, as a
selling point to the public the name was invaluable. Signifi-
cantly, no mention of liability was had in connection with this
discussion.
4. With respect to the potential liability of their clients, and
of others involved in the underwriting, especially those liable
under section 11 directly, almost all firms have taken great pains
to drive home the significance of BarChris, and the necessity for
independent verification predicated upon a complete reading of
the registration statement. (See qs. 6 & 15.) This has been ac-
complished through the use of several vehicles varying from an
extensive memorandum to counsel's client (See Exhibit A) to a
meeting in which liability was discussed. Most notable of the
innovations is the change wrought in the questionnaire to offi-
cers, directors and controlling stockholders. In these question-
naires a brief explanation of the BarChris decision is now given,
along with the suggestion, and sometimes instruction, to read the
registration statement and the material contracts. In furtherance
of this, specific questions are asked of these individuals pertain-
ing to crucial portions of the registration statement such as the
description of the issuer's business and the description of the
issuer's competition. (See Exhibit B.) The following is a sample
of the additional language and content of the questionnaire:
A. Explanation and Instructions
1. Read the registration statement and state whether it is
complete and accurate.
2. Notify all of the potential liability and explain their de-
fenses and duties under section 11. Put in section 11.
3. Have an explanation of who and who is not an expert.
4. Explain what a reasonable investigation is in "prudent
man" language.
5. Put in the BarChrls quote as it relates to new and outside
directors.
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B. Specific Questions
1. List all unclear statements and incorrect statements and list
what you think would be of material interest to an investor con-
templating buying this stock. List the section.
2. If you know of any material contracts of the company not
listed in Item 31(b) of Part II of the registration statement,
please describe the contracts below. (Explain that the SEC states
that any contract made in the ordinary course of business should
be listed in Item 31(b) and filed as an exhibit if any officer,
director, promoter, voting trustee, principal security holder, or
underwriter are parties; or if the company's business is sub-
stantially dependent on the contract; or if it concerns a signifi-
cant lease; or if it concerns the sale or acquisition of assets; or
it is of a nature which investors ought to be informed.)
Lastly, everyone is warned that they are required to keep
abreast of all changes and discoveries and report them immedi-
ately.
Some firms employed more than one device to communicate
the prospect of liability emphasizing at the initial general meet-
ing that all directors should undertake an independent investi-
gation. The extent of such investigation was not indicated.
5. It was the general consensus that due diligence meetings,
before BarO/rs, were worthless and a complete waste of time
as an investigative tool. The major criticisms were directed to
the makeup and the extent of the meeting. The individuals most
necessary to the success of the meeting were oftentimes absent.
The individuals the underwriters would send were analysts
usually trying to obtain selling information. Lastly, the person
representing the management of the issuer is always the highly
optimistic president who directs most of his optimism toward the
analysts. As a consequence only a cursory examination is given
to the registration statement, with most of the questioning di-
rected to the president.
There is now a split in the firms as to the value of a due
diligence meeting and the split is not an insubstantial one. For
instance, several firms have "beefed up" the meeting so that
it includes more key personnel from the issuer, and the under-
writers were engaged in the investigation, instead of just
analysts. The content of the meeting has also been beefed up to
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include a complete review of the registration statement. In this
regard, it should be noted that counsel expressed doubt as to
whether this will in fact occur. This was the general thought of
those counsel who felt that the meeting would always be a waste
of time. (See q. 11.)
Some firms, who represented issuers, indicated that they now
require one or two due diligence meetings for the directors. In
fact, one firm indicated that it requires three meetings; one at
the outset, to inform the directors and officers of their responsi-
bilities and liabilities, the second just before the filing of the
S-1, and the third right after the SEC's letter of comment
wherein all the red line changes are discussed. It was advised
that the managing underwriter attend (or his counsel) and if so
invited it was urged by underwriter's counsel that the under-
writer attend.
It was interesting to note that some of the firms who still held
only an informal due diligence meeting with the underwriters
now require a directors' due diligence meeting.
6. There appeared to be unanimity among counsel regarding
the impracticality and desirability of having interim figures
audited and certified. (See q.16.) No explanation was given other
than it would have been unusual to request such an audit. It was
the writer's impression that the question of audited interim fi-
nancials had not been seriously contemplated by counsel and that
BarChAis had not sparked the thought.
7. All of the counsel questioned stated that they had never
represented an accounting firm or engineer specifically in con-
nection with a public offering, nor had any of them been con-
sulted in this regard, except one. (See q.2.) The implication that
most easily comes to mind is that these experts ordinarily do not
seek out legal advice either as to the potential liability, or as
to any standard which must be maintained by them when per-
forming their tasks. It is suggested that some provision be made
by company counsel to inform them of their responsibilities and
liabilities.
8. Question 22 was directed specifically to the role of the group
underwriter in the investigation process. Posed in two parts,
one concerned with whether an independent investigation should
be made by the various underwriters, and the other with the
extent of the investigation, if there be any, the response elicited
1969]
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was singular in nature: no investigation, independent or other-
wise, is now undertaken by the group, nor is any recommended.
The group underwriters have chosen to stand or fall with the
managing underwriter as they have done in the past. There were
comments that the group underwriters could do more, but no
concrete suggestions were forthcoming, except that they should
be told to read the registration statement and perhaps the due
diligent meeting could be beefed up.
Since there were expressed doubts as to the validity of the due
diligence meeting, as a foundation for establishing due diligence,
inquiry was made of counsel as to any alternative measures that
could be taken by the group underwriters for their protection.
The response was not directed at investigation or verification,
but was directed toward reliance upon the underwriters' indemn-
ity agreement with the issuer and on insurance if the same were
available for the offering. What seemed clearly evident from the
inquiry was that no group underwriter would attempt to estab-
lish a due diligence defense apart from that which would have
to be proven by the managing underwriter, notwithstanding the
fact that Congress and section 11 intended for them to be held
to a lesser standard than the managing underwriter, a standard
which they could perhaps meet if they so elected.
The following discussion, dealing with the remainder of the
questionnaire, shows the various lines of demarcation between
counsel.
1. Counsel was not in concert on the question of whether more
than one cold comfort letter should be required of the account-
ants. Most were content to have the usual single letter, but the
trend seemed to be toward requiring one just prior to the effec-
tive date, with a second being delivered at the closing.' 8 ' (See
q.12.)
2. Response to questions 7, 8 and 9, concerning the number and
experience of the attorneys preparing the S-1, or conducting the
investigation on behalf of the underwriters, varied from one
experienced partner and one associate to five experienced drafters
(three partners and two associates with from 10 to 20 years ex-
perience). The majority of firms had from two to three attorneys
engaged in the undertaking, with the complement being one
181. For an excellent example of the "new" cold comfort letter, a product of
BarChris, see Jordan, BarChris and the Registration Process, 22 Sw. L.J. 790,
at 807 (1968).
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partner, one senior associate and one novice. One firm indicated
that if the partner were older, and less prone to vigorous activity
the novice would be replaced by a more seasoned associate.
Lastly, it was generally stated that major contracts, corporate
minutes, and other material documents were not examined by the
novice. It was not clear whether this was the case before Bar-
CArs and the point was not pressed in the discussion. What
chores could be entrusted to the novice is unclear as most counsel
demurred to the question.
3. While there was general agreement that investigations have
become more comprehensive in nature since BarCh'Ais, there was
disagreement as to the exact extent of the investigations and to
the methods that should be employed. (See qs. 13 & 14.) Some in-
vestigation guidelines were exhaustive consisting of an examina-
tion of all substantial contracts, documents, minutes (parent and
subsidiary, including all committee minutes), a physical inspec-
tion of all property if the issuer was relatively new, inquiry into
outside sources such as factors, suppliers, other parties to the
major contracts, examination into the complete corporate struc-
ture, a thorough check into the background of all top officers
and directors, a check into the issuer's general reputation, a
complete examination of all financials and notes to the finan-
cials, and a thorough examination of the questionnaires received
from the directors, officers, and controlling stockholders. To
this there were further suggestions:
1. Check all financial relationships of the issuer with
the third person.
2. Check previous major contracts to ascertain whether
there was any difficulty in payments or delivery.
3. When reading any minutes check specifically for
any reference to any material contracts, transactions, or
developments which should be considered for mention
in the prospectus or registration statement. (A further
purpose for this is to provide for an opinion with respect
to the valid organzation and legal existence of the
corporation, its stock or other securities or possibly other
matters which should be covered in counsel's opinion
letter.)
4. Make a written memo reporting the examination,
mentioning by references to contracts, transactions or
developments that which seems in any way material or
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creates any doubts, legal or otherwise, as a result of an
examination of the minutes. This memo should be
reviewed by the partner in charge.
If the minute books are incomplete obtain the miss-
ing minutes and obtain a certificate from the corporate
secretary stating that the minute books are complete.
5. If the issuer makes periodic reports to its stock-
holders or to the SEC, or any other regulatory agency,
these reports should be examined for at least five years
preceding the date of review.
6. If any engineering, management or similar special
reports describing or evaluating the company's business
has been prepared within the past five years the report
should be carefully reviewed by counsel and by a repre-
sentative of the underwriter, and the issuer as well.
7. As regards backlog, all big orders must be checked
and if there are thousands of small orders then a check
of the filing procedure is in order, along with a sam-
pling check of tho orders.
8. Check the validity of real estate leases and titles.
If examination is not made then indicate so in the
prospectus.
9. Check all financials with the underwriter's analyst,
the underwriter, the issuer's top officers, the account-
ants, and both sets of counsel at a time when all are to-
gether and when there is no pressure of time.
10. Update the registration at three crucial times: 1.
prior to filing, 2. prior to filing final amendment, and
3. at the closing.
11. Document each step and phase of the investiga-
tion.
12. Consult with the accountants at each step of the
investigation.
13. Spell out to the client exactly what you have
done.
The schism in policy among the ranks of underwriters' coun-
sel while not surprising is interesting, for it was widened
considerably by the BarGh~is decision. Prior to BarGhris under-
writers' counsel usually assumed the major role in the under-
writers' investigation, with the underwriter undertaking the
[Vol. 21
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initial investigation only. This division of labor was clearly
dramatized in the BarChris case, wherein the underwriter, after
his initial investigation, limited his chores to an attendance of a
few meetings.
Some firms readily admitted a change in policy since Bar-
C ris, mainly because of the language employed therein con-
cerning the underwriter's duty, and collaterally, due to counsel's
liability potential. These firms now require the underwriter to
assume an active role in the investigative process; to be present
at every step in the drafting and to actively participate in
obtaining verification of all important representations. The
underwriter is warned of his responsibility and potential liabil-
ity and advised that he cannot rely on lawyers or accountants to
discharge his obligations. Specifically, he is advised to know the
background of all personnel, all business aspects of the issuer,
and the corporate structure. Further, he is advised to read all
major contracts, all minutes, and all important corporate docu-
ments. Lastly, they are advised not to limit their investigation
to purely an internal inquiry, but rather to seek outside sources
of information.
Placing the responsibility squarely upon the shoulders of the
underwriter, state the firms, gives credence and substance to
underwriter's counsel's opinion letter, which invariably, as evi-
denced in BarChris, disclaims any attempt at verification of the
completeness and accuracy of the information contained in the
registration statement.
Those firms which continue to assume the major role in in-
vestigation without too much aid from the underwriter, will
invariably continue to give the same opinion letter, although one
firm indicated that it would deliver two letters to the under-
writer: one the formal opinion letter, and the second, describing
what had been done in the way of preparation and investigation.
There was no doubt in the minds of counsel, who required
their underwriter-clients to actively investigate, that they could
incur no liability for failing to thoroughly investigate.1 2 They
gave two reasons for their position. One, they clearly state at the
182. For a nice treatment of the subject of lawyers' liability to the client or
to third persons for material misstatements or omissions in the registration
statement see Henkel, Liability of Counsel for Underwriter, BarChris Con-
ference, supra note 105, at 641. Cf., Freeman, Liability of Counsel for Issuer,
id. at 635.
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outset that theirs is an advisory role only, with the exception of
some legal opinions and two, the underwriters cannot rely upon
them totally, especially when advised to actively participate and
especially in light of the opinion letter which disclaims verifica-
tion on the part of counsel. 183 This is clearly within the lan-
guage of the court treating of the underwriters' unfounded re-
liance upon its counsel in the face of counsel's opinion letter.
(See q.20.)
4. Questions 18, 19 and 21 attempted to treat the problem
of the nominal or outside director, and many firms were found
to be seriously concerned, notably those firms representing the
managing underwriter, for traditionally the underwriter usually
placed a partner on the board of the issuer as part of the under-
writing deal. The relationship was advantageous from both the
standpoint of the issuer and the underwriter for the issuer
gained not only prestige by having a sophisticated businessman
on the board, but also gained an additional selling point for the
stock, while at the same time, the underwriter was placing itself
in an advantageous inside position to watch the company. Ordi-
narily the underwriter-director did not assume too active a role
in directing the corporation. Since BarCkis, MerriZ Lynch, 184
and other recent cases concerning directors and insiders con-
nected with investment banking firms, the position has become
a dangerous one liability-wise not only for the individual di-
rector, but for the investment banking firm as well.
Thus, counsel for many underwriters are suggesting that the
partners not seek out positions on the board. But if the under-
writing firm professes a wish to still do so, the attorney advises
them of the multiple dangers, and counsels the necessity, under
BarChrks, to undertake an independent investigation. It is
recommended that the partner appointed to seek the directorship
be a student of the particular industry of which the issuer is a
part, as well as the issuer itself. A few firms stated that under
no circumstances would they advise joining the board, unless
the company were well-established, mature, and enjoyed a sub-
stantial reputation. Even then, the above criteria would apply
to the partner. Indemnification of the partner by his under-
writing firm was suggested by many counsel.
183. See Harris, BarChris Conference, id. at 660, for opinion letters of coun-
sel,
184. SEC Admin. Proceeding, File No. 3-1680 (August 26, 1968).
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5. The response of counsel to question 17, inquiring into
whether if, representing the issuer and an insider, counsel should
suggest that the insider obtain other counsel for the offering, was
negative, with the exception of only one attorney. These officers
and inside directors should stand or fall with the other executives
and the issuer's chosen counsel. Due to their inside position they
must have a mutuality of trust and confidence. Of course, if they
have any doubts, or are aware of any facts which would lead
them to doubt, they must either voice these doubts, obtain outside
counsel if not satisfied with the answers, or in the alternative,
withdraw from the board. Since there is a presumption of al-
most complete knowledge of the corporate affairs placed upon
the insiders no independent investigation was recommended, save
under certain circumstances where suspicious facts would lead a
prudent man to explore further. (See q. 21.)
6. With respect to the outside director there was again dispute
among the various counsel. Most said that he must make at least
a nominal investigation consisting of a reading of the registra-
tion statement, attending all meetings, reading the major con-
tracts and minutes of meetings missed by the director, and, of
course, questioning the officers. A few said that he must go
beyond this and make an external investigation as well as a more
complete internal verification. Lastly, two attorneys stated that
unless the director can show that he was quite familiar with the
issuer's business, and had in fact actively participated in direct-
ing the company, he had no business being on the board and
probably could not sustain his due diligence defense, absent a
showing of an extensive investigation. This was particularly
emphasized in the case where the director was an attorney or
analyst, or possessed some other special skill. (See q. 19.)
The above findings were relatively true when discussing the
"new" director as well, although more counsel were of the
opinion that they would advise the individual not to join the
board in the first instance.' 8 5
A. Globus, Indemnification and Insurance
7. Questions 23, 24, and 25 were directed primarily at the
significance of that portion of the Globus v. Law Research'88
decision striking an indemnification agreement, at ascertaining
185. This opinion has been expressed previously. See Meeker, BarChris
Conference 573, at 578, s'pra note 105.
186. Supra note 177.
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the general attitude toward the continuing strength of these
agreements, and at gleaning the desirability of obtaining insur-
ance to cover section 11 liability. Since indemnification was not
at issue in Barekr-, 87 and thus not previously discussed, some
foundation will be laid in order to give significance to the replies
of counsel.
In Gobus, the court voided an underwriter indemnity agree-
ment holding that indemnity agreements against Securities Act
liability violated public policy in that they minimize the penalty
for breaching the law, and because the agreements have a ten-
dency to reduce the underwriter's incentive to perform his role of
investigation, concomitantly reducing investor protection. This
holding was narrowed substantially because the jury, in award-
ing punitive damages first had to come to a finding of "gross
fraud", "wanton dishonesty", or "fraudulent conduct involving
a high degree of moral turpitude". Stated in its narrowest terms
the holding stands only for the proposition that indemnification
will be disallowed where the indemnitee is found guilty of mis-
conduct evincing actual knowledge or reckless disregard of the
falsity of the statement made. s18  But there is every indication
that the principle will be expanded, either by the SEC or by
further court action.
The SEC has shown sweeping opposition to agreements in
which a corporation indemnifies its officers, directors, or other
controlling persons, holding the same to be void as against public
policy;189 the reason for this being that the stockholders should
not be obligated indirectly to reimburse the wrongdoer.1 0 The
SEC enforces its policy in two ways; one, it may refuse to ac-
celerate the effective date of the registration if there is an in-
demnity provision, 191 and two, if the situation arises where the
187. See supra note 179, and accompanying text.
188. 287 F. Supp. at 199. The Second Circuit was likewise held to the nar-
rower issue and stated, "thus it is important to emphasize at the outset that at
this time we consider only the case where the underwriter has committed a sin
graver than ordinary negligence." Supra note 177 at 98,242.
189. SEC Rule 460, 17 C.F.R. § 230.460 (1969).
190. See generally Note, Indemnification of Underwriters and Section 11 of
the Securities Act of 1933, 72 YALE L.J. 406, 411 (1962).
191. As acceleration is usually crucial in maintaining the distribution time
schedule, the SEC's power in this regard is vast. Avoidance of a denial of ac-
celeration can be effectuated if the officers, directors and control persons de-
liver waivers of the indemnification provision to the corporation or in the al-
ternative, if the corporation agrees in the registration statement that in the
event an indemnification claim is lodged against it, that it will submit the public
policy question to a court of competent jurisdiction and be bound by the court's
determination. SEC Rule 460, supra note 189. See Note, Securities Act of
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issuer does not seek acceleration the SEC will withhold approval
if the registration statement does not contain a statement
acknowledging the SEC's opinion that the indemnification pro-
vision is unenforceable. 192 While the SEC has not taken steps
to condemn indemnification agreements between the issuer and
others, namely the underwriters, there is no indication that they
may not do so in the future, since all of these agreements "dilute
investor protection by channeling the cost of liability back to a
company's stockholders."
193
But, even if the SEC doesn't act, the indemnification agree-
ment may find itself threatened by further court action. Indeed,
Judge McLean has echoed the philosophy of the SEC, in broader
context, by stating that the investigatory duties set forth in
section 11 charge everyone named within with the responsibility
for the truth of the prospectus. Further, while Globus spoke to
intentional wrongdoing, and was concerned with an action under
section 17, BarChis and section 11 speak to negligence and as a
consequence there need not be a showing of intentional wrong to
effectuate the purpose of the section. Thus, if indemnification
agreements undermine the effectiveness of section 11 they could
very well be voided on a showing of ordinary negligence.1
94
1933-Misleading Prospectus-Directors' Liability Under Section 11-Due Dili-
gence Defense, 42 TFmp. L.Q. 81, 90 (1968) ; Kroll, Some Reflections on In-
demnification Provisions and SEC Liability Insuance in the Light of BarChris
and Globus, 24 Bus. LAw. 681, 689 (1969). This agreement is more popularly
referred to as the "Johnson & Johnson formula": "Indemnification will not be
denied if indemnification is limited to reimbursement for expenses incurred in
the successful defense of a suit." Note, Securities Act of 1933-Misleading
Prospectus, id.
192. 17 C.F.R. § 230.460 note a (1969); Securities Act Release No. 4890,
December 20, 1967, p. 21.
193. See 82 HAiv. L. REv. 951, 959 (1969) and Note, Indemnification of Un-
derwriters and Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, supra note 190.
No reason is given for the SEC's abstinence regarding underwriters' indem-
nity agreements, although they stand in the same position as the other defend-
ants under section 11, other than Professor Loss' suggestion that the under-
writers "would be unwilling to assume the full risks of section 11, with attend-
ant dangers to the country's economic recovery." See 3 Loss, SEcURITIEs REG-
ULATION 1835 (1961).
194. The possibility of an expansion of the Globus rationale to prohibit in-
demnification for liability arising from negligent conduct has already been
noted. See generally Note, Indemnification of Underwriters, supra note 193.
Also, particular attention should be paid to the language of the Second Circuit,
which at several points reflected the philosophy of the 1933 Act. Particularly
significant was the recognition of the offensive nature of indemnification agree.
ments when employed to avoid liability under Section 11. The court stated:
Finally, it has been suggested that indemnification of the under-
writer by the issuer is particularly suspect. Although in form the
underwriter is reimbursed by the issuer, the recovery ultimately
comes out of the pockets of the issuer's stockholders. Many of
these stockholders may be the very persons to whom the under-
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As an alternative to indemnification, insurance for directors,
officers, underwriters and accountants should be considered.
While these policies may be offensive to public policy, if the
company must bear the entire cost of the premiums, they other-
wise should not be objectionable since the ultimate liability costs
are not directed back to the stockholders. 195 At the present time
the SEC does not prohibit paid insurance covering officers, di-
rectors, controlling stockholders, or underwriters, provided that
adequate disclosure is made.
From an underwriter standpoint insurance would seem to be
more desirable than an indemnification agreement. That in-
demnification agreements will be held to be void as against
public policy is more than just a mere possibility. Also, these
agreements are worthless if the issuer becomes bankrupt.
From the issuer's point of view, insurance may be a method
of retaining or attracting capable and highly qualified directors
and officers who may otherwise not want to assume the risk of
liability so vividly portrayed in BarChris.
From the investors' standpoint insurance is the best protection
against unwarranted loss.
While all of the attorneys polled, save two, were familiar
with Glob us, it was interesting to discover that only a few
thought that it would be expanded to outlaw all indemnification
writer should have been initially liable. The 1933 Act prohibits
agreements with purchasers which purport to exempt individuals
from liability arising under the act. 15 U.S.C. 77n.... The situa-
tion before us is at least reminiscent of the evil this section was de-
signed to avoid.
Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., supra note 177 at 98,243.
195. The Securities Act Release No. 4936, ff 46(c) (December 9, 1968),
states that "no waivers or undertakings need be furnished" with respect to in-
surance against liability arising under the Act. These insurance policies vary
in nature, see Kramer, BarChris Conference, 24 Bus. LAW. 709 (1969) and, of
course, can be very expensive, although they are now more readily available
than before. See Whitney at 590, Kroll at 685, and Greene at 701, BarChris
Conference, 24 Bus. LAw. Thus, some provision for pro rata sharing of the
premiums amongst all involved in the offering, or a "deductible provision"
might be considered. This is also desirable from a public policy point of view as
it would be an incentive against being lulled into complacent security by the
presence of insurance. In fact, a stiff deductible provision might prove to be
necessary, since it would give the incentive to investigate a boost, whereas
straight insurance coverage, paid by the company, would have the same ten-
dency to undermine the investigative purpose of section 11 as does the indem-
nification agreement. Kroll points out at 689, id., that there seems to be no ob-
jection to insurance where the director or underwriter purchases the same with
his own funds, but also notes that there is a belief that even this would offend
the Act. See Note, Indemnification of Directors: The Problems Posed by Fed-
eral Securities and Anti-Trust Legislation, 76 HARv. L. RFv. 1403, 1429 (1963).
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agreements. From the collective response it appeared that Globus
had not had a too significant impact upon counsel as a whole.
Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of those surveyed,
who predominantly represented underwriters, stated that in-
surance would be sought and obtained, if at all possible, not-
withstanding a continued practice of utilizing indemnification
agreements.
It was the writer's impression that the impetus toward in-
surance coverage was not so. much a result of the Globn,2 pro-
nouncement as it was a result of BarChris. In other words the
attorneys were looking toward insurance as an added protection,
perhaps against issuer bankruptcy as in 1?arC ris, rather than
as a safeguard against an expanded Globus decision.
It is suggested that Globu be reexamined with the attendant
outcome that the desirability of insurance be viewed not totally
from a BarChys vantage point, but also with a jaundiced eye
toward the continued vitality of indemnification agreements.
The end result may be that many financially unstable or
unseasoned companies may not be able to obtain public financing
in the event that insurance coverage is denied or too expensive.
Perhaps this is the best result, for if it is too risky for an in-
surance company then it may be too risky for the public. This is
not to say that the investor ought not to be allowed to play the
role of a fool in season; it is to say that they ought to be pro-
tected in the event that they are damaged by misrepresentation,
fraud, or negligence. It is not a highly unlikely possibility that
in a given case the issuer may be bankrupt, with the underwriters
and others involved under section 11 devoid of sufficient funds
to compensate the harmed investors.
(Indeed, in BarChAis, both the issuer and one of the under-
writers were in bankruptcy.) In this situation compensation
would be forthcoming through insurance coverage; thus the
ultimate beneficiary, the investing public, is fully protected.
CoNcLUSIoN
The Sixties have witnessed what seems to be a new era of
investor protection, for not only has there been an expansion of
common law notions concerning negligence and misrepresenta-
tion such as evidenced in Fihrer v. Mletz,196 and Rush Facto8,
196. Supra note 167.
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Inc. V. Levin,1 97 but also a somewhat revolutionary expansion in
the number of civil remedial vehicles afforded the "defrauded"
investor in the 1933 and 1934 Acts has taken place through such
cases as SAEY v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 198 Ellis . Carter,
199
J.1. Case v. Borac,200 and of course, Glob=s. All of these cases
have implied remedies through traditionally "criminal" sections.
The significance of this trend finds import not so much in the
innovative ingenuity of plaintiffs' counsel in utilizing criminal
sections to find implied civil remedy as it does in highlighting the
question as to why resort is taken to these alternate routes in the
first place. Perhaps the answer lies somewhere between necessity
on the one hand, and desirability on the other.
But BarChris has awakened section 11, and it may prove to
have been a sleeping giant now that it has definition and sub-
stance. Yet, one cannot help wonder whether its teeth should not
be sharpened to bring order to the maelstrom that is called civil
liability under the Acts. The short statute of limitations, the
compensatory limitations, and the threat of a security for costs
no doubt have driven section 11 plaintiffs to other sections of
both Acts as witnessed by Globus, Fischman v. Rayheo)n Mfg.
Co.,201 and Rosen v. Bergman,202 and judges, commiserating
with these plaintiffs, have been prone to lend benediction to the
transfers. A continued expansion of section 17(a) and Rule
10b-5 in this direction would, it seems, be clearly undesirable.
Thus, some legislative thought should be given to a revamping
of some of these features of section 11, as well as to very neces-
sary further clarification of some of the more perplexing prob-
lems raised by BarChria and inherent in the section.
197. Id.
198. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
199. 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
200. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
201. 188 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1951).
202. 40 F.R.D. 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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